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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a domestic relations determination,
which is within this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 782a-3(2)(i), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the district court erred in granting summary

judgment for the Plaintiff by determining that no substantial
change in Plaintiff's income and financial circumstance had
occurred since the entry of the divorce decree not contemplated
within the divorce decree itself.
Standard of Review: Correction of Error.

Higgins v. Salt

Lake County, 855, P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah App. 1994).
Issue Preserved: (R. 475-512 & R. 654-666)
2.

Whether the district court erred in denying summary

judgment for the Defendant for a reduction or termination of
alimony by determining that no substantial change in Plaintiff's
income and financial circumstance had occurred since the entry of
the divorce decree not contemplated within the divorce decree
itself.

1

Standard of Review: Correction of Error.

Higqins v. Salt

Lake County, 855, P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah App. 1994) .
Issue Preserved: (R. 475-512 & R. 654-666)
3.

Whether the district court abused its discretion in

awarding Plaintiff's attorneys fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-27-56.
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion.

Wells v. Wells,

871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994); Utah Dep't of Social
Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991).
Issue Preserved: (R. 475-512 & R. 654-666)
4.

Whether the district court abused its discretion in

denying an award of Defendant's attorneys fees.
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion.

Wells v. Wells,

871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994); Utah Dep't of Social
Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991) .
Issue Preserved: (R. 475-512 & R. 654-666)

2

GOVERNING STATUTES
The issues presented on appeal are governed by the following
statutes:
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order - Judgment.
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support
under any child support order, as defined by Subsection
62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the date it is due:

(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of
any judgment of a district court, except as provided in
Subsection (2);
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit
in this and in any other jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or
any other jurisdiction, except as provided in
Subsection (2).
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child
support order may be modified with respect to any period
during which a petition for modification is pending, but
only from the date notice of that petition was given to the
obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the
obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner.
78-27-56. Attorney's fees - Award where action or defense in bad
faith - Exceptions.

(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith,
except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only
if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of
impecuniosity in the action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1).

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce modification proceeding involving issues
of substantial changed circumstances for modification of alimony.
On June 17, 1993, Defendant Jack Jones brought a Petition for
Modification of Decree of Divorce. (R. 240-42)

The parties

conducted some discovery, and Plaintiff Diane Jones brought a
Motion for Summary Judgment on September 6, 1994. (R. 399)

Jack

filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on September 26, 1994.
(R. 473-74) After oral argument, the district court denied Jack's
Motion for Summary Judgment, denied Jack's requested attorney
fees, granted Diane's Motion for Summary Judgment, and awarded
attorney fees to Diane. (R. 707-10, Addendum, hereafter "Add.,"
52-55)

Summary Judgment was entered on January 3, 1995.

(R.

724-26, Add. 57-59) Jack thereafter filed a timely Appeal on
January 27, 1995, challenging the grant of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment and the denial of his Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment, as well as the grant and denial of attorney fees. (R.
730-31)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Diane Jones and Defendant Jack Jones were Married
on July 1, 1973, in Anchorage, Alaska.
Jones, R. 495, Add. 44, K 2)

(Affidavit of Jack Lloyd

When they were first married, Diane
4

worked outside the home for approximately three years.
45, H 4)

(Add. 44-

After long discussion, however, it was decided that

Diane would quit work and pursue a career in law.

Diane made a

commitment that she would follow through and become a practicing
attorney so that both she and Jack could enjoy the financial and
other benefits of having a working attorney in the family. (Add.
44-45, H 4)
At the time Diane decided to attend law school, there were
no law schools in Alaska.

Therefore, Jack left a job offer for

over $60,000 per year and relocated to Utah.

Jack accepted a job

paying $12,000 per year, and financially and emotionally
supported Diane through law school.

(Add. 45, 1 5)

Diane

attended Law School from September of 1976 until the Spring of
1979.

She passed the Utah Bar exam in the Summer of 1979.

Diane's tuition, law books, and other support was paid by Jack.
(Add. 45, H 6)

On September 3, 1979, Diane gave birth to the

parties first and only child, Amber M. Jones. (Add. 44, f 3)
During the parties marriage they lived quite frugally.

The

most expensive cars they ever owned were a new AMC Javelin which
they purchased for approximately $3,400 and a used Thunderbird
purchased for approximately $5,000.

The monthly payments on

these cars was never over $100 to $150 per month. (Add. 50, 1) 24)

5

From the time Diane passed the Utah Bar exam until their
separation in April or May of 1991, Jack tried to persuade Diane
to find employment and do something with her law degree as the
parties had agreed in the beginning.

Diane's refusal to seek

employment was the main point of contention between the parties
during those years. (Add. 45-4 6, % 7)

Diane did do some minimal

work such as establishing a tax preparation business on a small
scale.

She also took on a few cases as an attorney.

However

Diane did not obtain full time employment as was contemplated in
the parties original discussions. (Add. 45-46, % 7)

Even after

Amber started school in 1984, Diane refused to work. (Add. 46, H
8)
In April or May of 1991, the parties marital problems became
sufficiently severe that they separated.

(Add. 46, 1 9)

Diane

filed for Divorce in June of 1991. (R. 2-10) The divorce took
nearly 18 months, and included numerous proceedings.
Hil 9-12)

(Add. 46,

In a temporary order, entered in June of 1991, the

court granted Diane temporary alimony and child support combined
at $1,500 per month, a very high rate.

(R. 19)

The court also

ordered Diane to find employment, however, she failed to procure
any.

(Add. 46, 1 10)

In January of 1992, Diane began her own

law practice, but ran at a loss.

(Financial Declaration, R. 86,

Add. 34)
6

After Diane began her law practice, she stated repeatedly to
Jack that she was not earning any money.

In all the settlement

discussions, Diane and her Attorney continually asserted that she
was not making any income from her law practice and that all the
income was being eaten up by expenses. (Add. 46, 1 12) Never did
the parties contemplate what Diane might earn in her law practice
to reduce the alimony she received.

Alimony was based solely

upon her representations that she was making $80 per month.
(Add. 46 & 49, 11 12 & 19)
On June 5, 1992, a pretrial conference was held.

Jack and

his attorney tried to get Diane to admit that she was making an
income from her law practice.

However, she would not.

She

continued to assert that she was not earning any profit besides
the Eighty dollars ($80.00) income from caring for horses.
46-48, 11 12-13)

(Add.

The parties therefore entered into a

stipulation on the record based upon this income. (Add. 47, 1 13)
Due to difficulties with dividing Jack's Deferred Income Plan,
the parties had to rework this stipulation.

(Add. 48, 1 16)

In September of 1992, the parties hammered out another
agreement and reduced the agreement to writing with the parties
and their attorneys present.

(Add. 48-49, 11 18-19)

Diane was

an attorney licensed to practice law at this time. (Add. 45, 1 6)
The agreement was entered based on Diane's stated income of $80
7

per month and was signed and sworn to by the parties.
(Stipulation for Entry of Decree of Divorce, hereafter
"Stipulation," % 12, R. 143, Add. 7)
Pursuant to the agreement, Jack was to pay $650 per month in
alimony.

(Add. 7, H 12)

The parties also stipulated that Jack

would have access to Diane's business records every six months so
that alimony could be decreased as soon as Diane's income went up
from $80 per month.

(Add. 7-8, 1 12/Add. 48-49, 1 20)

The

parties further stipulated that Jack could petition the court for
reduction in alimony based on changes in Diane's income from time
to time,

(Add. 7-8, ^ 12), and that Jack's obligation to pay

alimony would terminate at such time as Diane was able to provide
for her own support, but in any event would terminate at the end
of 5 years.

(Add. 7-8, 1 12). These terms were accepted by the

court and incorporated into the court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decree. (R. 153-154, Add. 16-17, ^ 14; R.
161-162, Add. 25-26, H 13)
The agreement also provided that Jack would pay child
support of $43 0 per month consistent with the guidelines based on
Diane's income of $80 per month. (Add. 2-3, % 2)

Jack was not

concerned about an increase in Diane's income increasing child
support since an increase in her income would have very little
effect on his child support obligation. (Add. 49, % 21)
8

Jack obtained Diane's business records in the latter part of
March, 1993.

The records showed a substantial increase in income

from the $80 per month earned at the time of divorce.
1 23)

(Add. 50,

Therefore, Jack filed a Petition to reduce or terminate

alimony on June 10, 1993. (R. 240-42)
Diane's monthly expenses increased from approximately $1,729
at the time of the parties divorce in 1992 (R. 88, Add. 36) to
$2,221 as of July 11, 1994. (R. 386, Add. 39/ Affidavit of Diane
Jones, R. 430)

These expenses include the costs and care

associated with the parties' minor child.

(Add. 39)

The bulk of

the increase has occurred in Diane's auto expenses and auto
payments, which combined have gone from $100 to $584 per month.
(Add. 3 6 & Add. 39). The increased auto expenses are due to her
purchase of a vehicle worth approximately $20,000. (Add. 50 & R.
430)
In calendar 1993, Diane had gross monthly income of at least
$1,773.00.

(R. 429) From January through July of 1994, she had

gross monthly income of at least $1,867.54, (R. 429-30), and has
received additional income of $2,800.00 through barter and trade.
(Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's Request for Admissions,
Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents,
Interrogatories No 10 & 14, R. 515-17)

Excluding the barter and

trade income, Diane's income has increased by at least $1,693.00
9

per month in 1993 and by at least $1,787.00 in 1994 from the
amount she was earning at the time of the parties' divorce.
(Add. 48 and R. 429) This is an increase in income of at least
$20,316 per year in 1993, and at least $21,444 on a yearly basis
in 1994 over the income of Diane at the time of the divorce.

She

has had a 21 fold increase in her income.
Diane moved for summary judgment on September 6, 1994,
claiming that the alimony stipulation was not based on $80 per
month as set forth in the stipulation and that the divorce decree
itself anticipated future income from her law practice in
reducing her alimony award. (R. 3 99-418)

She also argued that

Jack's petition for reduction or termination of alimony was
frivolous and therefore warranted attorney fees pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56.

Jack cross moved for summary judgment

asserting that there had been a substantial change of
circumstances as a matter of law, and that he was entitled to
reduction or termination as a matter of law. (R. 473-94)

He also

claimed attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
The court granted summary judgment in Diane's favor ruling
that her income from her law practice was contemplated in the
decree itself, that Jack had not genuinely controverted any
material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment in Diane's
favor, that Jack had not shown any reasonable probability of
10

prevailing at trial, and that Jack's petition for modification
was frivolous warranting a grant of attorney fees of $4,146.00.
(R. 707-10, Add. 52-55; R. 7, Add. 58)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court erred in granting Diane's motion for
summary judgment and denying Jack's cross motion for summary
judgment.

The Stipulation for Entry of Decree of Divorce ( the

"Stipulation") sworn to by the parties, the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (the "Findings"), and the Decree of Divorce
(the "Decree") are unambiguous and set forth $80 per month as
Diane's income relied upon by the parties to establish the level
of alimony.

This issue is res judicata.

The Decree specifically

provided that as Diane's income increased, her alimony would
decrease, and when she had sufficient income to support herself,
alimony would terminate completely.

Stipulations and Decrees are

subject to construction according to the same rules that apply to
all written contracts.

Such contract should be interpreted to

give all terms effect if possible.
Diane's income is now sufficient to support herself at the
standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage.
Therefore, Jack is entitled to termination of alimony as provided
in the Stipulation, Findings, and Decree as a matter of law,
11

retroactive to June 10, 1993, the date of filing for
modification.

In the alternative, Diane's income has increased

sufficiently to constitute a substantial change in circumstances
as a matter of law.

In order to give effect to all the terms of

the Stipulation, Findings, and Decree providing for a reduction
in alimony, Jack should be entitled to an appropriate reduction
retroactive to June 10, 1993.

Interpreting Diane's increased

income as insufficient for a reduction in alimony makes the
reduction terms of the stipulation of no effect.

In the final

alternative, if the court finds the Stipulation, Findings, and
Decree are ambiguous, there are disputed issues of fact as to
what the parties intended.

Therefore, summary judgment is

inappropriate, and the case should be remanded for trial on what
the parties intended by their agreement.
The district court abused its discretion in awarding
attorney fees to Diane.

The facts show that Diane's income has

increased substantially since the divorce, increasing from $80 to
more than $1,700 per month, with her reasonable expenses in the
same range.

The petition to modify or terminate alimony was

brought by Jack in good faith, believing that the increase in
income was substantial for modification of alimony and based upon
the advise of his attorneys.

This belief was supported by the

court commissioners recommendation that alimony be reduced and
12

therefore he pursued the proceeding further.

(R. 3 90, Add. 43)

Accordingly, Jack's petition was not without merit or brought in
bad faith, and attorneys fees should not have been awarded to
Diane.
The district court abused its discretion in denying Jack's
attorney fees.

The undisputed facts show that Diane's income has

increased substantially since the entry of the divorce.

The

agreement of the parties is unambiguously set out in the
stipulation of the parties and provides for termination of
alimony on Diane's ability to provide for her own support, and
also for decreases of alimony when income increases occur below
this level.

Diane can now support herself.

Therefore, Diane's

defense that no modification of alimony should be made is
frivolous and without merit, warranting attorney fees.

ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD
Ordinarily, denial of a motion for summary judgment is not

appealable.

However, where there are no issues of material fact,

and the matter is before the court, the court has the power to
direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of either party
when both parties filed motions for summary judgment.

13

Christensen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 443 P.2d 385, 389
(Utah 1968) .
In reviewing a summary judgment, this court applies the
analytical standard required of the trial court, liberally
construing the facts and evidence in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion.

Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark,

755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988) . No deference is given to the
trial court's legal conclusions.

Id.

If the court concludes

there is a material issue of fact, the case is remanded for a
trial on that issue.

Id.

Courts should not weigh disputed facts

in ruling on a summary judgment.

It doesn't matter whether the

evidence on one side seems strong or even compelling, one sworn
statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute the
averments and create an issue of fact precluding summary
j udgment.

Id.

Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, and if
determined to be unambiguous, its interpretation is a question of
law entitled to no deference by this court.

Frontier

Foundations, Inc. v. Layton Construction Co.f Inc., 818 P.2d
1040, 1041-42 (Utah App. 1991).

If the contract or judgment is

ambiguous, and there is disputed facts as to what the parties
intended, summary judgment is not appropriate, and evidence as to

14

what the parties intended should be received and considered,
„,»; ,Ji:.y Seven Rodeo -,J?;•rp, Sj,ipi;_a,,

II.

TK ! : : COUirr ERRFD IN GRANTING DIANE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
\MKtr UP* DF.NYING J A C K T MOTTON" FOR SUMMARY JODHMFNT
Alimony W;p; .Sot; Based upon Diane's Income of. $00 per
Month at; the Time of Divorce and Jack's Right to
Petition for Modification upon Changed Circumstances Is
Conclusively Established by the Stipulation, the
Findings
- * •"ho Decree, and ir res judicata.
The unequivocal

and unambiguous language of * he Stipulation
' '•

"*

n«- L .me ,;f $oi .a) poi month.
the parties on September

(

tie' s :i ncome

';;,• .;i i] uiaiaji: was signed by

! • . :a : .*wo - *~" .;nder oath by
] edge

14r)-'i«',, .•Ju-:,

* '.

Paragraph

u. ui ;. in-

i

i :pulation provides:

The parlies s' ipulate and agree that p l a i n t i f f s present
gross monthly income is $80.00 and rhat defendant's gross
ithly income from his employment; is $4/300.00. Based upon
3 respective parties' income as set forth herein, it is
stipulated and agreed that the defendant will pay to the
-'lintiff, alimony jn the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars
JO. 00) per month.
It is further agreed, however, that at
such time as Defendant has paid to Plaintiff the sums
immediately due and owing to her under the terms of this
_.cement, a total of Fourteen Thousand Two Hundred and
Fifty Dollars, (14,250.00),, a ] :i mony shall be immediately
reduced to the sum of Six Hundred and Fifty Dollars
($650.00) per month.
It is further agreed that defendant's
obligation to pay alimony to the [plaintiff] shall terminate
within five years from date of entry of a decree of divorce
herein, or at such time as the Court may order based upon a
change in plaintiff's circumstances and p l a i n t i f f s ability
to provj de for her own support.

15

It is stipulated and agreed that for purposes of determining
defendant's continued obligation to pay alimony to
plaintiff, plaintiff will provide to defendant at his
request, through her counsel Ronald E. Kunz, copies of
plaintiff's business records and tax returns, for purposes
of determining plaintiff's continued need to receive alimony
from defendant. It is further agreed that defendant shall
be entitled to receive such financial information from
plaintiff every six months, and such information shall be
provided by plaintiff to the defendant within thirty days
after receiving written request therefore. It is agreed
that the defendant may petition the Court, by way of a
motion, for a reduction in alimony payments and an
adjustment of child support based on changes in the
Plaintiff's income from time to time.
(Add. 7-8, emphasis added).

The Findings follow suit, and were

signed and entered by the court on September 23, 1992. (R. 15354, Add. 17-18, H 14)

The Decree was entered based on the

Findings and stipulation at the same time.

(R. 156-163, Add. 20-

17) Both the Findings and the Decree were approved as to form by
Diane's counsel.

(Add. 19 & 27)

Diane's Memoranda in the trial court are replete with
alleged facts not part of the parties' Stipulation. (R. 401 et
seq.)

She attempted to have the court look behind the

Stipulation.

But unless the documents are ambiguous, parole

evidence should not be allowed.

In Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248

(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
. . . when a decree is based upon a property settlement
agreement, forged by the parties and sanctioned by the
court, equity must take such agreement into consideration.
Equity is not available to reinstate rights and privileges
voluntarily contracted away simply because one has come to
regret the bargain made. Accordingly, the law limits the
16

c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n of the court w h e r e a p r o p e r t y
settlement agreement has b e e n incorporated into the d e c r e e ,
and the outright abrogation of the p r o v i s i o n s of such an
agreement in only to be resorted to w i t h great r e l u c t a n c e
and f ~~ "omne"! 1 i ng reasons .
Land v. Land, nos r.2d 3248, 1250-ni
'"•'V!ft-od and emphasis adder
III'.' I 'JL'. l

.'Utah 19PP X

'citations

lio Stipula* i ^n is rot a m b i g u o u s

. -' i

should rr-,id t ho °ni ire stipulation as whole, cvia

attempt

har T "^nize and < ? i vo effect t-.> ill of t h ^ rv nit r a n

i•

^rnvipionn."

lMieisen v. P ' R e i M ; .
attorney cat Lh** - :::

tha f.L ipu j at i on was signed and vui, a r

r e p r e s e n t e d uy c o u n s e l .

ii i*

income or anticipated income

* irti^r K->d relied en of-h^y-

.

•• :

-J.-.I

y

had ihn hnnwl r>dgo and the representation to heave changed the
. T> •• •"-

'

>:1^CL

that.

Instead, the

c,

tipul at: i or ^nd Findings

clearly and unambiguously reflect that

:r.

L-a

u p o n the respective parties" income as set: forth
bed ng $80 0 0 j: n ^r m o n t h for D i a n e .

-n-.n^d

;T] herein. r'

(Add. 7, \\ 12 and A d d . 1 1 , \

1,4)
~*
m-'V'

J

h<'j

1

iuio r« negotiation, Diane insisted that she w a s

• •

al Linoiiy.

' ~*r prar' ire nivi therefor w a s in need of
(ArM

:• i

.-...

;

s

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , Jack agreed to pay alimony at the specified
lf' • -n

( * ! dd. 4'/-- ! 11 19) Diane now wishes to go b e y o n d the
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record and allege that alimony was based upon income that she had
at the time, but was unwilling to disclose during negotiations.
(R. 426-27, % 22)
unjust.

To allow Diane to do this would be manifestly

The Stipulation and Findings clearly show that alimony

was awarded based on Plaintiff's income of $80.00 per month, and
not on any contemplation of future income.
This court has stated that:
. . . stipulations are conclusive and binding on the parties
unless, upon timely notice and for good cause shownf relief
is granted therefrom. The appropriate procedure to provide
such notice and obtain relief from a judgment based on a
mistakenly executed stipulation is to file a motion pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), seeking relief because of
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, lf
within three months after the judgment order or proceeding
was entered.
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah App. 1990) (citations
omitted and emphasis added).

Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court

has held that
When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata
as to those issues which were either tried and determined,
or upon all issues which the party had a fair opportunity to
present and have determined in the other proceeding. This
principle also applies in the context of a divorce decree.
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985) (citation
omitted).

In light of this court's and the Supreme Court's

statements, the following facts are res judicata and conclusively
established:
a.

Diane's income at the time of divorce was $80.00 per
month. (Add. 7, f 12 and Add. 17, f 14)
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b

It was agreed on by the partis emu iuund uy i.no
that Jack should pay alimony of $650.00 per month
"based upon the respective parties' income as set
forth" in the Stipulation nod t-1-- Fl :icH-nrrs
'T ^
12 and Add. 17, f 1 4 )

c

It was further agreed by the parties, found b;v the
court, and decreed by the court that "defendant's
obligati on to pay al:i mony to the [plaintiff] shall
terminate within five years from date of entry of a
decree of divorce herein, or at such time as the Court
may order, based upon a change in plaintiff's
circumstances and plaintiff's ability to provide for
her own support." (Add. 7, 1 12; Add. 17, % 14/Add. 2526, 1 12;

"t

,. .oo: o..oo agreed by the parties, foin id by the court,
.ind decreed by the court that "the defendant may
petition the Court, by way of a Motion, for a reduction
in alimony payments and an adjustment of child support
based on changes in the Plaintiff's income from time to
time,"
'.Mrl/
'
'
* M ; o d d . 25-2*" c M )
The parties' "Lipulation creates a contractual framework
W h u : •< o y

• :O

' - ' < i'

\-. >

'

i change in I". Lane1..; o i. rrumsi ancos and hej
her

- m support.

alimony based < :.
Regular contractual

.ILL!*'

'Oil

. riu*.

Upon changes J u i nconv - !)^low providing

lane's increased I ricom- i i on ; nac

!

J* ;

1. or

wi :.. r

^

"ounl ructinn :i s applied *:r> ot opulations and

some level of" increased income below providing ;<<, Diane*.> w,n
support be sufficient for a reduction
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JLII

-alimony.

Otherwise, the

reduction provision would be of no effect since termination would
be the only option available.
No ambiguity exists in the documents here.
freely negotiated a stipulated settlement.

The parties

This Stipulation was

freely entered into and was a package deal with give and take.
Diane is therefore bound by its terms may not look beyond the
clear language of the document.

B.

Diane's Future Income from Her Law Practice Was Not
Anticipated to Decrease Alimony Award.

Diane contended in the court below that her income was
anticipated to reduce the amount of the alimony award, and that
this change in circumstance was therefore contemplated in the
divorce decree itself and unavailable to modify the decree. (R.
426-27, i( 22)

This court has stated:

The fact that the parties may have anticipated an increase
of income in their own minds or in their discussions does
not mean that the decree itself contemplates the change. In
order for a material change in circumstances to be
contemplated in a divorce decree there must be evidence,
preferably in the form of a provision within the decree
itself, that the trial court anticipated the specific
change.
Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah.App. 1990).

No

provision in the decree itself shows that the court anticipated
Diane's income from her law practice to decrease alimony.
there any evidence outside the record showing such a
20

Nor is

contemplate on by the court.

In fact, Liu-- n-l ipulation and Decree

clearly :i i id:i cate the court' s and the hirfi ^c
aid iiLony won] d be modi fied upon an inci eas-

contemplation f~hat

• ri -•

iti,

'e .

Johnson v. Johnson, this court held that a trial court
h if

•

ii I L S contemplations with specificity in L.XI<J

findings:
Lij; .; " .
. -*• ! knows that a party will be receiving
additional future income it should make findings as to
whether surh add 11- ioiia] income will affect the alimony
award.
[Lj.ir- i'iii:!, ""•«/, — —
- :..3cretion, delay the determination
of how the future income will affect the alimony award
However, the trial court must make findings indicating that
tl le future income has not: been considered in making the
,. Tit award, fiuch findings will then allow the payiing
spouse to bring a modification proceeding at; the appropriate
* :me while sn« isfyin^ M i ^ legal principles nrosented in Dana
I Durfee.
J O Ml

(ci rations o^vttod and emphasis added)

'i.i-.- v ^u> ! ;* = tins case

f o] i ^wed Johnson making specific findings regarding • he basis for

decrease from Lime <o i uti-' as* DLane's mo^me iii^r^ased
'^ the F.Lndinq". o\
!. \\\i:,'

.owhere

Decree assert that alimony w;.!, not change on
•' '

J.

I|l|,, x

I1' i ndi I K J S In

opposite to ho fr-in>, stating t.hat:
. . . defendant's obligation to pay alimony to the
[plaintiff] [sic] should terminate within five years from
the entry of the decree of divorce herein, or at such time
as the court may order, based upon a change in plaintiff's
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circumstances and plaintiff's ability to provide for her own
support.
. . . [T]he defendant may petition the Court, by way of
a Motion, for a reduction in alimony payments and an
adjustment of child support based on changes in the
plaintiff's income from time to time. (Add. 17, H 14)
This is not a case where the contemplated increase in income was
taken into account to decrease the amount of alimony awarded.
Diane's stated income at the time of divorce was the basis upon
which the court awarded alimony at the level granted, and it was
contemplated that when Diane's income increased, the alimony
award would decrease accordingly.
In the trial court, Diane relied entirely upon Moore v.
Moore, 872 P.2d 1054 (Utah App. 1994).
distinguishable.

However, Moore is

In Moore, the lower court's findings of fact on

the Petition to Modify revealed that the lower court had
anticipated the increased income of Mrs. Moore in setting the
original alimony award.

In this case, the Stipulation, Findings,

and Decree show that Diane's anticipated income was not a factor
in decreasing the amount of alimony awarded, but in fact could be
used to decrease alimony as such income was received.

The

holding in Moore cannot be read as an abrogation of the
unequivocal language of the Findings and Decree.

Moore is

further distinguishable in that the wife's income was still
lacking more than $1,400.00 to make her reasonable monthly
22

expenses.

Here, D:i ane's :i ncome is suffici ent to meet all of her

reasonable monthly exponr^n
during the m a r r i a g e .

\L>*H,

at t:h^ standard of living enjoyed
u ,• •

)

Month to Month Fluctuations in Income Is Insufficient
Grounds !o Den\ . i PfVhint -: -^-- •'-• "limony.
. * ho r i i.il ."ourt, Diane argued thru her income is
. ( ;, • r,; r w,, . . -/able to terminate or rrdu"'
i!3)

This arg ument is a red herring.

'l^m^nv

•;_:<:: „• nar .

fP

o*
/] J

~

:IL.J--

: ",- support horse.lf and cannot use her own lack •*! planning to
income for dttorr "••"" "an be
unstable, Jiow'--.-' , :.i the gooa i-i^n. hs you save and in - _.. -Lti
months you uso the saving to tide van «v/. • . Jnch i:hcoUl n t be

5'ubstVMit ial Changes oi Circumstances lias Occurred
'* Durfee , tliis court' restated the standard

for

On a petition for a modification of a divorce decree, the
threshold requirement for relief is a showing of a
substantial change of circumstances occurring since the
entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree
itse] f
Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P. 2d 713,, 716 (Utah A p p . 199b)

(Quoting

Stettler v. Stettler, 713 P. 2d 690, 71-1 « * ih 198r;)
pre v ious] y

a-; • 1

practice was nut. .mticipated
originally awarded.

' * • " — • raw
oecreaso t lie amount of alimony

What w^ls contemplated was that upon an
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increase of Diane's income, Jack could petition for reduction or
termination of alimony.
There is no material issue of fact which disputes that Diane
was earning $80.00 per month at the time of the parties divorce.
The issue of Diane's income at the time of divorce has been
conclusively established and is res
these parties.

judicata

with respect to

There is also no material issue of fact that

Diane's monthly income for 1993 was at least $1,773.00 and her
gross monthly income for 1994 was at least $1,867.54, even
excluding her barter income of $2,800 in 1994. (R. 429-30, HH 31
& 33)

This is an increase in income of at least $1,693.00 per

month in 1993 and at least $1,787.00 in 1994 above Diane's income
at the time of divorce.

This is an increase in income of at

least $20,316 per year in 1993, and at least $21,444 per year in
1994 over the income of the Plaintiff at the time of the divorce.
She has had a 21 fold increase in her income.
This case is similar to Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757 (Utah
1982).

In Haslam, at the time of divorce, the Defendant husband

was ordered to pay monthly alimony of $200.00.

This order was

based on his income of between $1,000 and $1,200 per month.
plaintiff wife was unemployed at the time of divorce.

The

Since the

divorce, the plaintiff obtained a job earning $1,100 per month,
the defendant's income remained approximately the same as at the
24

time of divorce, ami the plaintiff claimed expenses of
• w - ] ; : • •-• : r. -.: r-]

'

' .

The court reiterated thn*- :

provisions in the original decree of divorce g r a m i.ng
alimony, child support, and the like must be readily
susceptible to alteration at a later date, as the needs
vh! ch such provisions were designed to fill /ire subjer4- *~ ^
:..•> H and unprodi citable change.
Ha si am (>f>7 I1. :M a i
(Utah 1081

^-i r mi;L then went on to 1io3 d 4:hn- a substantial
•••',l

c n W'M

i quoting Foulger v. Fouigei ,

,

:-,'":J

had occurred under the r.-vtr ^ r *~^r case,

and remanded tho <"• u-,rj for a determination of
amount: t^ be made.

Td.._

ir

:'KH^ ** •

- •'•'•.-•^ -;:-;-<r.

-

n

Diane has had a dramatic increase in
aaintiff in Ha si am.

Similarly, Jack is entitled i<> judgment as a matter of law that a
substantial change of circumstances liar; occurred.
.'

• i«* n- - ",. : /.- v.;reased Income Has Compensated for i i: -. *
•1 i mony Awarded and She Can Now Provide for Rei Own
oort. Therefore, Alimony Should Be Terminated, or at
.* i-ii nimum, Reduced to an Appropriate Level, Ret ^active
to June 10, 1993, the Date of the Petition for
Modif icat i on

This court has i leld that:
the fundamental purpose of alimony ".,:.. i_; enable v.uc
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to
prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge." . . . The
appropriate test to determine whether the termination in
alimony was appropriate is whether plaintiff is now able to
provide for herself a standard of living which is equal to
that enjoyed during the marriage of the parties.
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Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242-43 (Utah App. 1990)
(Quoting Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)).

The

parties specifically provided in their stipulation that alimony
would terminate when Diane was able to provide for her own
support. (Add. 7, 1 12 and Add. 17, 1 14)
The case at bar is similar to Bridenbaugh.

In Bridenbaugh

the original divorce decree awarded the plaintiff $400 per month
alimony.

At the time of the divorce, Plaintiff was not employed.

She obtained a Master's degree in Social Work and was later
employed at a yearly salary of $16,203.00 and was able to provide
for her own support.

The defendant's income increased from

$30,000 at the time of divorce to $240,000 at the time of the
petition for modification.

Defendant conceded that he was able

to pay alimony, but argued that there was a sufficient change in
circumstances in plaintiff's income to terminate alimony.

The

court agreed holding that the lower court had not abused its
discretion in terminating alimony.

Likewise, in the case at bar,

alimony should be terminated.
Diane's income along with the child support she is receiving
is sufficient to support herself and maintain the standard of
living she enjoyed during the marriage.

She was awarded a

substantial property settlement from the divorce and received all
of the equity in the home, as well as $14,250.00 to pay the
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second mortgage 01 i the home. (Add. 4- r

"
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12)

This

s e t t l e m e n t w a s p a r t of t h ^ o a c k a g e deal '*'•• • rh i n ^ ' u d ^ ^ niimv .
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1 ,

payments were never over $100 to $150 per month.

(Add., 50, ^

24) The purchase of a vehicle for nearly $20,000 was not within
the standard of living enjoyed by the parties.
Diane argued below that this $20,000 vehicle was necessary
to provide reliable transportation for her law practice, but this
cannot be taken at face value. (R. 430, H 34) Certainly vehicles,
even new vehicles, in a lower price range could have easily
supplied this at less than half the monthly expense.

Numerous

attorneys drive new vehicles purchase for under $10,000.

The

cost of this new vehicle should be excluded from Diane's monthly
expenses as not within the standard of living enjoyed by the
parties.

Excluding the increased expenses due to the new

vehicle, Diane has monthly expenses of $1,73 7.00.
Diane's income has more than compensated for the alimony
payments.

She is now able to provide for herself a standard of

living which is equal to that enjoyed during the marriage of the
parties.

In 1993 she had gross monthly income, including child

support, of $2,203.00.

(Add. 2-3, H 2;R. 429, t 31)

To July of

1994, she has a gross monthly income, including child support, of
$2,297.54. (Add. 2-3, H 2;R. 429, H 33)

Her monthly expenses as

set forth in her Financial Declaration of July 1994, and
excluding the increase due to the new vehicle she purchased is
$1,73 7.00.

Her income leaves her nearly $500 above her
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reasonable living expenses, which is more than sufficient to pay
her taxes.

There is no material issue of fact which disputes

that Diane's income has more than compensated for the alimony she
has been receiving from Jack and that she is now capable of
providing for her own support.
Diane disagreed below with the inclusion of child support as
income in determining her need for alimony.

However, her

financial declaration includes all of the expenses for the minor
child in the monthly expenses. (Plaintiff's Financial Declaration
dated July 11, 1994 "Wife - Custodial Parent - 1 minor child
included in expenses.", Add. 39)

Since the expenses for the

minor child are included in the monthly expenses listed for
Diane, it is proper that her income should include child support
which is intended to cover the child's care and expenses.
Diane also objected below to the use of gross income instead
of net after taxes.

However, if a net after tax calculation is

used, it must be adjusted for the tax benefit Diane will receive
from a termination of alimony.

Alimony is included as income to

the payee spouse and as a deduction to the payor.
and 215)

(I.R.C. § 71

Therefore, at a 15% bracket, Plaintiff will receive a

federal tax benefit from the termination of alimony in the amount
of $97.50 per month.

Excluding the state tax benefits Diane will

receive, Diane's after tax income would be $1,400.50 for 1993 and
29

$1,494.50 for 1994.

(R. 522-523, (1,303 and 1,397 + 97.50)).

Adding the monthly child support of $430 per month, Diane has
after tax income of $1,830.50 for 1993 and $1,924.50 for 1994.
This leaves $93.50 per month for 1993 and $187.50 per month for
1994 over and above her reasonable expenses.

With these amounts

and the $100 remaining in the budget for a vehicle, Diane could
obtain a vehicle in line with the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage.
Finally, Diane argued below that her budget stated in her
financial declaration is a shoestring budget.

However, a careful

review of the budget displays that this is not the case.

She has

listed $350 per month for food and household supplies for two
people, and $100 per month for entertainment, and $125 for
incidentals.

(Add. 39)

She has also listed $159 per month for

other expenses which includes an allowance of $64.50 for the
minor child, upkeep of horses for $65.00 per month, and
veterinary bills of $21.00.

(Id.)

There is undoubtedly ample

room in Diane's budget.
The court has the discretion to modify the support payment
retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition for
modification.
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child
support order may be modified with respect to any period
during which a petition for modification is pending, but
only from the date notice of that petition was given to the
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obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the
obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6.

Such a retroactive modification to

the date of filing the petition is appropriate here in light of
the income Diane was indisputably making over the entire term of
the proceedings in the lower court.

III. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING DIANE'S
ATTORNEY FEES BY FINDING JACK'S PETITION TO MODIFY
FRIVOLOUS, UNMERITORIOUS, AND BROUGHT IN BAD FAITH
The district court abused its discretion in awarding
attorney fees to Diane.

The facts show that Diane's income has

increased substantially since the divorce, increasing from $80 to
more than $1,700 per month, a 21 fold increase.

The petition to

modify or terminate alimony was brought by Jack in good faith,
believing that the increase in income was substantial for
modification of alimony and based upon the advise of his
attorneys.

This belief was supported by the court commissioners

recommendation that alimony be reduced. (R. 3 90) Accordingly,
Jack's petition was not without merit or brought in bad faith,
and attorneys fees should not have been awarded to Diane.
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IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING JACK'S
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES BASED ON THE UNMERITORIOUS NATURE
OF DIANE'S DEFENSE.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 provides:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith,
except under Subsection (2).

Diane's defense of this case is without merit and not brought in
good faith.

In the analogous case of Jacobsen v. Jacobsen,

Supra, Mr. Jacobsen entered into a stipulated property settlement
for divorce.

In the stipulation, Mr. Jacobsen granted all the

property accumulated during the marriage to Mrs. Jacobsen. Mr.
Jacobsen later brought a lawsuit alleging that Mrs. Jacobsen had
induced him to sign the property settlement agreement upon the
express condition that she would reconvey to Mr. Jacobsen a onehalf interest in the real property that was the subject of the
suit.

As previously quoted, the trial court found the matter

barred by the doctrine of res

judicata,

granted summary judgment

for Mrs. Jacobsen, and awarded attorneys fees against Mr.
Jacobsen based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 holding that the
action was not brought in good faith.

The Utah Supreme Court

affirmed.
Similarly here, Diane argues a defense which is without
merit, the majority of the issues being res
32

judicata

and

conclusively established.

Further, Plaintiff has been able to

litigate her position without restraint due to her position as an
attorney and her ability to swap legal services with her counsel.
Diane has had no actual out of pocket expenses for attorneys
fees.

(R. 537)

Jack, on the other hand has incurred substantial

amounts of attorney fees in this proceeding.

Therefore, it is

equitable that Jack be awarded his attorney fees incurred in
pursuing this action below.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Jack respectfully requests this
Court to: (1) reverse the Summary Judgment in Diane's favor; (2)
reverse the award of attorney fees to Diane; (3) reverse the
denial of Summary Judgment in Jack's favor and remand to the
trial court for entry of Summary Judgment terminating alimony;
and (4) and reverse the denial of Jack's attorney fees.

In the

alternative, Jack requests a direction of summary judgment on the
issue of substantial change in circumstances with a remand for
determination of the appropriate level of alimony, or a remand
33

for trial to resolve any ambiguity the court may find in the
parties Stipulation.
DATED this

f

day of June, 1995.

feXVB.
Skoubj
Forney for^T)efendant/Appellant
Jack Jones

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 7
day of June, 1995, I
caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing to be hand
delivered to the following:
John K. Rice
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellee
17 North Main Street
P.O. Box 896
Midvale, Utah 84047
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*

DIANE SHARON JONES,

*

k

i<

k

*

*

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)

STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF
DECREE OF DIVORCE

)

JACK LLOYD JONES,
Defendant.

)

Civil No. 914902425DA

)

Judge Homer Wilkinson

* * * * * * *

The parties in the above-entitled action appeared at a
pre-trial conference before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on
June 5, 1992.

Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented

by Ronald E. Runs:.

Defendant appeared in person and was

represented by Nicolaas de Jonge.

A stipulation was entered

into by the parties at the pre-trial conference, which
stipulation was recul into the record.

However, the parties

having discovered additional information which rendered those
those provisions of the stipulation reletting to Defendant's
retirement and deferred income plans impracticable and the
parties having negotiated a new stipulation hereby agree to the
following:
1.

The parties acknowledge and agree that each party is a

fit parent to have custody of the minor child, Amber Michelle

Jonesr and that joint cuslody of the child be awarded, with
physical custody residing with the Plaintiff, as primary
custodian, and with defendant designated as secondary
custodian.

It is further agreed that defendant be awarded

reasonable rights of visitation with the parties1 minor child,
which minimum rights of visitation shall be in accordance with
the district court guidelines, a copy of which is attached
heireto.
Defendant's rights as a secondary custodian shall include
the following:

(i) the rjght to notice, consultation and input

with respect to any extraordinary medical treatment, (i.e., any
medical treatment other than routine examinations or treatment
for minor illnesses); (ii) the right to notice, consultation
and input v/ith respect to elective medical treatment; (iii) the
right to consent to emergency medical treatment when the
child is present with Defendant during visitation periods or if
Plaintiff Ccinnot be reasonable and promptly contacted; (iv)
direct access to school records and Lhe right to notice and
participation in parent-teacher consultations; (v) direct
access to medical records; (vi) right to consultation and input
with respect to any special needs of the child.
2.

The Defendant earns a gross monthly income in the sum

of $4,300.00 per month and the plaintiff earns a gross monthly
income of $80.00 per month.

Based on the respective parties1

income, the parties stipulate and agree that the defendant
shall pay $430.00 per month as child support which amount is in
accordance with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines currently

o

n t\ r.

in use by the Court.

The Defendant's obligation to pay child

support for and on behalf of the parties1 minor child shall
terminate when said child attains the age of eighteen (18) or
she is otherwise emancipated.

The Decree of Divorce shall

contain an order authorizing mandatory withholding for support
in the event defendant is in arreeirs cit least thirty (30) days
with his obligation to pay child support.
3.

Defendant presently has ^wail^lble through his place of

employment full and comprehensive medical and dental insurance
for the benefit of the parties' minor child.

It is stipulated

and agreed between the parties that the defendant will continue
to carry m e d i a l and dental insurance for the benefit of the
parties' minor child, as long as such insurance is available to
him through his place of employment.

It is further agreed that

all routine medical and dental expenses not covered by
insurance shall be paid for by Plaintiff.

All non-routine

medical and dental expenses incurred for the benefit of the
parties' minor child shall be shared equally by the parties.
It is further agreed and understood by the parties that the
diabetic care and treatment received by the minor child, Amber
Michelle Jones, slmll not be considered routine medical
expenses and both parties agree to share equally in the expense
incurred Cor such treatment and care.

It is agreed that

plaintiff will provide to the defendant copies of billings of
all non-routine medical and dental expenses incurred for the
benefit of the parties' minor child, and the defendant agrees
to pay direct to medical providers, within thirty days of
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receipt thereof his one-half share thereof.

It is further

agreed that plaintiff sha] 1 provide medical and dental
insurance for the minor child at such lime as such insurance
becomes available to her at a reasonable cost.

Defendant

should be ordered to provide plaintiff, upon receipt, copies of
medical and dental insurance benefit statements.
4.

The college fund currently held under the Uniform Gift

to Minors Act for the bencfil oJ the minor child with the
plaintiff acting as sole custodian shall be split equally
between the parties.

Defendant will act as custodian and be

required to invest one half (1/2) as he chooses under the
provisions of the Uniform Gift to Minor's Act.
5.

The parties stipulate and agree that except as

otherwise specified herein, the personal property should be
awarded as the parties have herelofore divided it.

It is

further agreed that the disparity in the division of personal
property in favor of the plaintiff is offset by Defendant's
receipt of Six Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($6,300.00)
through the sale of PacifiCorp common stock in June, 1991.
6.

It is stipulated and agreed that the residence located

at 9717 South 1600 West, South Jordan, Utah be awarded to the
Plaintiff, as her sole and separate property, subject to the
mortgage liability thereon, which plaintiff should be ordered
to pay and dischaige on a current basis and to hold defendant
harmless therefrom.

If is further agreed that the defendant

will quit-claim all of his right, title and interest to
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plaintiff within ten dcays after entry of the decree of divorce
herein,
7.

The parties stipulate and agree that the unimproved

real property consisting of 2.48 acres located at approximately
9775 South 1550 West, South Jordan, Utah be sold forthwith, and
that the net sale proceeds be awarded to the Defendant as his
sole and separate property.

It is further agreed that the

defendant will be responsible to pay and discharge any and all
income taxes which may be incurred as a result of the sale,
costs of said sale, and 1991 property taxes accrued to the date
of sale.

It is further agreed that plaintiff will provide to

defendant all records and documentation in her possession
evidencing the original purchase price of subject property and
monies spent for capital improvements thereon.
8.

The parties stipulate and agree that the real property

located east of Colorado Springs, consisting of 46.89 acres,
should be awarded to Defendant as his sole and separate
property, subject to a Two Thousand Dollar ($2,000.00)
equitable lien awarded to Plaintiff.

It is further agreed

between the parties that the lien awarded plaintiff shall be
payable upon the sale of subject property or upon the minor
child reaching the age of eighteen years, whichever event
occurs first.

Said lien shall not accrue interest.

It is

further agreed that Plaintiff will quit claim said property to
Defendant within ten days from the date of entry of a decree of
divorce herein.
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9.

During the marriage the defendant accumulated certain

retirement benefits through his present employer, PacifiCorp.
It is stipulated and agreed that the plaintiff should be
awarded a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) in
Defendant's retirement account through PacifiCorp.

It is

further agreed that plaintiff's interest in defendant's
retirement account is limited to her equal share of retirement
benefits accrued to the defendant through the date of entry of
the decree of divorce herein.
10.

The parties stipulate and agree that the defendant pay

to Plaintiff the sum of Nine Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty
Dollars ($9,250.00) as her agreed upon share of the PacifiCorp
common stock acquired during the parties' marriage.

It is

further agreed that defendant will pay said amount to plaintiff
from the proceeds of the sale of the land at 9775 South 1550
West, South Jordan, Utah.

Plaintiff is responsible for any

taxes and penalties incurred for the sale of Seven Thousand
Dollars ($7,000.00) of PacifiCorp common stock through a
hardship withdrawal.

Defendant will cooperate in providing the

necessary documentation for determineifion of Plaintiff's tax
liability on the stock sale for the filing of her 1992 Federal
and State tcix returns.
11.

The parties stipulate and agree that the Defendant pay

to Plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in
lieu of any interest she may have in the Deferred Compensation
Plan available to Defendant through his present place of
employment.

Upon the payment by defendant to plaintiff,

plaintiff irrevocably waives any rightf title and interest she
may otherwise have had in defendant's Deferred Compensation
Plan,

The patrtL.es further agree that the $5,000.00 payable by

the defendant to the plaintiff hereunder shall be paid from the
net proceeds from the sale of the unimproved land at 9775 South
1550 West, South Jordan, Utah.
12.

The parties stipulate and agree that plaintiff's

present gross monthly income is $80.00 and that defendant's
gross monthly income from his employment is $4,300.00.

Based

upon the respective parties' income as set forth herein, it is
stipulated and agreed that the defendant will pay to the
plaintiff, alimony in the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars
($800.00) per month.

It is further agreed, however, that at

such time as Defendant has paid to Plaintiff the sums
immediately due and owing to her under the terms of this
agreement, a total amount of Fourteen Thousand Two Hundred and
Fifty Dollars, (14,250.00),

alimony shall be immediately

reduced to the sum of Six Hundred and Filty Dollars ($650.00)
per month.

It is further agreed that defendant's obi igeition to

pay a] imony to the defendant shall terminate; within five years
from date of enLry of zi decree of divorce herein, or at such
time as the Court may order, based upon a change in plaintiff's
circumstances and plaintiff's ability to provide for her own
support.
It is stipulated and agreed that for purposes of
determining defendant's continued obligation to pay alimony to
plaintiff, plaintiff will provide to defendant at his request,
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through her counsel Ronald E. Kunz, copies of plaintifffs
business records and tax returns, for purposes of determining
plaintiff's continued need to receive alimony from the
defendant.

Tt is further agreed that defendant shall be

entitled to receive such financial information from the
plaintiff every six months, and such information shall be
provided by plaintiff to the defendant within thirty days after
receiving written request therefore.

Tt is agreed that the

defendant may petition the Court, by way of a Motion, for a
reduction in alimony pciyments rind an adjustment of chiid
support based on changes in the Plaintiff's income from time to
t i me.
13.

It is stipulated and agreed that each of the peirties

hereto will pay and discharge their respective costs and
attorneys' fee incurred herein.
14.

It is stipulated and agreed that each of the parties

hereto will pay their respective debts and obligations incurred
since the parties' separation on M£iy 17, 1991 and each eigrees
to hold the other harmless for any liability therefrom.
15.

It is stipulated and agreed that the defendant shall

obtain and maintain life insurance on his life in the minimum
amount of $50,000.00, naming the minor child, Amber M. Jones as
the beneficiary of such policy.

Defendant is free to name a

trustee of his choice should those benefits become payable.
Defendant shall provide annual proof that such a policy is
being maintained for the benefit of the minor child.

Said
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policy should remain in effect until the child attains the age
of 18 years,
16a

It is stipulated and agreed that each of the parties

agrees to cooperate with the other, through their respective
counsel, to effect changes in titles to property agreed to be
divided hereunder and to insure that the Stipulation entered
into is carried out in every detail.
17.

The parties stipulate and agree that this Stipulation

is a complete settlement of all rights either party may have in
the other's property, whether presently existing or hereafter
acquired.
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DATED this _/
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day of September, 1992.
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R^o n a l d E. Kunz
Attorney for Plciintiff

^Nicolaa'&•>'de" Joft ge' *\.
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STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)

ss.

Diane S. Jones, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes
and states that she is the plaintiff in the within matter, that
she has read the foregoing, knows the contents thereof, that
the same are true to the best of her knowledge except those
matters based on belief, cind as to those matters she believes
a a i\

them to be true.
., „ J ^ Qsi
Diane S. Jonps

r .„,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me Lhis _/ day of
September, 1992.

\ »~ C<k

•MQTAIIY DUDLT-e

LCSUHA.D2JO;:G2

msamjC'SasEdusH
4212 HIGHl AND DRIVE
SALTLAKEC(TY.UT84124

C0MM.EXP.10-1CO4

STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Jack L. Jones, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and
states that he is the defendant in the within matter, that he
has read the foregoing, knows the contents thereof, that the
same are true to the best of his knowledge except those matters
based on belief, and as to those matters he believes them to be
true.

JricflcL. Jones

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

/

y

day of

September, 1992.
NOTARY PUBLIC

"
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LGSLIEA.D2J0;:G2
fOTJIBlfPUBlC'SRIFdUEW
4212 HIGH1AND DRIVE
SALT LAKE CnY.UT 84124

COMM.EXP.10-1G-04
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SEP 2 3 1992

NICOLAAS DE JONGE (0859)
Attorney for Defenclcint
4212 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone: 27 2-10]3

B/

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

DIANE SHARON JONES,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. 914902425DA

JACK LLOYD JONES,
Defendant.

Judge Homer Wilkinson

* * * * * * *

The parties in the above-entitled action appeared at a
pre-trial settlement conference before the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson on June 5, 1992.

Plaintiff appeared in person and

was represented by her counsel, Ronald E. Kunz.

Defendant

appeared in person and was represented by his counsel, Nicolaas
de Jonge.

A stipulation was entered into by the parties at the

pre-trial conference, which stipulation was read into the
record.

However, the parties having discovered additional

information which rendered certain provisions of the
stipulation relating to Defendant's retirement and deferred
income plans impracticable, the parties negotiated a new
stipulation which was duly signed and executed by the parties
and their respective counsel, the original of which has been
filed with the Court.

This Court having reviewed the

stipulation, and the dei'endanL having withdrawn his ansv/er and
counterclaim on file herein, therefore his default v/as entered.
Based upon the testimony of the plaintiff, and based upon the
records, files and pleadings filed herein, and good cause
appearing therefore, the Court now hereby enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
3. That plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and was so for more that throe months prior to the
filing of the complaint in thjs matter.
2.

That the parties have encountered differences during

their marriage which cannot be reconciled, making continuation
of the marriage impossible.
3.

That each party is a fit parent to have custody of the

minor child, Amber Michelle Jones, and that joint custody of
the child be awarded, with physical custody residing with the
Plaintiff, as primary custodian, and with defendant designated
as secondary custodian.

That defendant be awarded reasonable

rights of visitation with the parties1 minor child, which
minimum rights of visitation shall be in accordance with the
district court guidelines, a copy of which is attached hereto.
That Defendant's rights as a secondary custodian shall
include the following:

(i) the right to notice, consultation

and input with respect to any extraordinary medical treatment,
(i.e., any medical treatment other than routine examinations or
treatment for minor illnesses); (ii) the right to notice,
consultation and input with respect to elective medical
treatment; (iii) the right to consent to emergency medical
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treatment when the child is present with Defendant during
visitation periods or if Plaintiff cannot be reasonable and
promptly contacted; (iv) direct access to school records and
the right to notice and participation in parent-teacher
consultations; (v) direct access to medical records; (vi) right
to consultation and input with respect to any special needs of
the child.
4.

That Defendant earns a gross monthly income in the sum

of $4,300.00 per month and that plaintiff earns a gross monthly
income of $80.00 per month.

Based on the respective parties1

income, the Court finds that the defendant should be ordered to
pay $430.00 per month as child support which amount is in
accordance with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines currently
in use by the Court.

That Defendant's obligation to pay child

support for and on behalf of the parties1 minor child should
terminate when said child attains the age of eighteen (18) or
she is otherwise emancipated.

That plaintiff should be

entitled to an order authorizing mandatory withholding for
support in the event defendant is in arrears at least thirty
(30) days with his obligation to pay child support.
5.

That Defendant presently has avai leible through his

place of employment full and comprehensive medical and dental
insurance for the benefit of the parties1 minor child.

The

Court finds that the defendant should bo ordered to continue to
carry medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the
parties1 minor child, as long as such insurance is available to
him through his place of employment.

n

The Court further finds
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that all routine medical and denial expenses not covered by
insurance should be ordered paid for by Plaintiff, and that all
non-routine medical and denial expenses incurred for the
benefit of Lhe parties1 minor cluld should be shared equally by
the parties.

That the diaboMc care and treatment received by

the minor child, Amber Michelle Jones, will not be considered
routine medical expenses and each of the parties should be
ordered Lo share equally in the expense incurred for such
treatment and care.

That plaintiff will provide to the

defendant copies of billings of call non-routine medical and
dental expenses incurred for the benefit of the parties1 minor
child, and the defendant should be ordered to pay direct to
medical providers, within thirty davs after receipt thereof,
his one-half share thereof.

That plaintiff should be ordered

to provide medical and dental insurance for the minor child at
such time as such insurance becomes available to her at a
reasonable cost.

That Defendant should be ordered to provide

to plaintiff, upon receipt, copies of medical and dental
insurance benefit statements.
6.

That the college fund currently held under the Uniform

Gift to Minors Act for the benefiI of the minor child with the
plaintiff acting as sole custodian should be split equally
between the parties.

That Defendant will act as custodian and

be required to invest one halt (1/2) as he chooses under the
provisions of the Uniform Gift to Minor's Act.
7.

That except as otherwise stated herein, the personal

property should be awarded as the parties have heretofore

A
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divided it.

That the disparity in the division of personal

property in favor of the plaintiff is offset by Defendant's
receipt of Six Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($6,300.00)
through the sale of PacifiCorp common stock in June, 1991.
8.

That the residence located at 9717 South 1600 West,

South Jordan, Utah should be £iwarded to the Plaintiff, as her
sole and separate property, subject to the mortgage liability
thereon, which plaintiff should be ordered to pay and discharge
on a current basis and to hold defendant harmless therefrom.
That the defendant should be ordered to quit-claim all of his
right, title and interest in subject property to plaintiff
within ten days difter entry of the decree of divorce herein.
9.

That the unimproved real property consisting of 2.4 8

acres located at approximately 9775 South 1550 West, South
Jordan, Utah should be sold forthwith, and that the net sale
proceeds be awarded to the Defendant cis his sole and separate
property.

That the defendant be ordered to pay and discharge

any and all income taxes which may be incurred as a result of
the sale, costs of said sale, and J 991 property taxes accrued
to the date of sale.

Furthermore, that plaintiff should be

ordered to provide to defendant all records and documentation
in her possession evidencing the original purchase price of
subject property and moni.es spent for capital improvements
thereon.
10.

That the real property located east of Colorado

Springs, consisting of 46.89 acres, should be awarded to
Defendant as his sole and separate property, subject to a Two
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Thousand Dollar ($2,000.00) equitable lien awarded to
Plaintiff.

That the lien awarded plaintiff should be payable

upon the sale of subject property or upon the minor child
reaching the age of eighteen years, whichever event occurs
first.

Said lien shall not accrue interest.

That Plaintiff

should be ordered to quit claim said property to Defendant
within ten days from the date of entry of a decree of divorce
herein.
11.

That during the marriciqe the defendant accumulated

certain retirement benefits through his present employer,
PacifiCorp.

That the plaintiff should be awarded a Qualified

Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) in Defendant's retirement
account through PacifiCorp.

Furthermore, that plaintiff's

interest in defendant's retirement account should be limited to
her equal share of retirement bene Cits accrued to the defendant
through the date of entry of the decree of divorce herein.
12.

That the defendant should be ordered to pay to

Plaintiff the sum of Nine Thous£tnd Two Hundred and Fifty
Dollars ($9,250.00) as her share of the PacifiCorp common stock
acquired during the parties' marriage.

That defendant should

be ordered to pay said amount to plaintiff from the proceeds of
the sale of the land at 9775 South L550 West, South Jordan,
Utah.

That Plaintiff be responsible for any taxes and

penalties incurred for the sale of Seven Thousand Dollars
($7,000.00) of PacifiCorp common stock through a hardship
withdrawal.

Furthermore, that Defendant should be ordered to

cooperate in providing the necessary documentation for
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determining Plaintiff's tax liability on the stock sale for the
filing of her 1992 Federal and State tax returns.
13.

That the Defendant should be ordered to pay to

Plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in lieu
of any interest she may have in the Deferred Compensation Plan
available to Defendant through his present place of employment.
That upon payment by defendant to plaintiff, plaintiff shall
thereafter irrevocably waive any right, title and interest she
may otherwise have had in defendant's Deferred Compensation
Plan.
Furthermore, that the $5,000.00 payable by the defendant
to the plaintiff hereunder shall be paid from the net proceeds
from the sale of the unimproved land at 9775 South 1550 West,
South Jordan, Utah.
14.

That plaintiff's present gross monthly income is

$80.00 and that defendant's gross monthly income from his
employment is $4,300.00.

That based upon the respective

parties' income as set forth herein, defendant should be
ordered to pay to the plaintiff, alimony in the sum of Eight
Hundred Dollars ($800.00) per month.

That at such time as

Defendant has paid to Plaintiff the sums immediately due and
owing to her as provided herein, a total amount of Fourteen
Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars, (14,250.00),

alimony

should be immediately reduced to the sum of Six Hundred and
Fifty Dollars ($650.00) per month.

That defendant's obligation

to pay alimony to the defendant should terminate within five
years from the entry of a decree of divorce herein, or at such
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time as the Court may order, based upon a change in plaintiff's
circumstances and plajntill's ability to provide for her own
support.
Ttuit for purposes of determining defendant's continued
obligation to pay alimony to plaintiff, plaintiff should be
ordered to provide to defendant, at his request, through
Plaintiff's counsel Ronald E. Kunz, copies of plaintiff's
business records and tax returns, for purposes of determining
plaintiff's continued need to receive alimony from the
defendant.

That defendant should be allowed to receive such

financial information from the plaintiff every six months, and
such information shall be provided by plaintiff to the
defendant within thirty days after receiving written request
therefore.

That the defendant may petition the Court, by way

of a Motion, for a reduction in alimony payments and an
adjustment of child support based on changes in the Plaintiff's
income from time to time.
15.

That each of the parties should be ordered to pay and

discharge their respective costs and attorneys' fees incurred
herein.
16.

That each of the parties should be ordered to pay

their respective debts and obligations incurred since the
parties' separation on May 11,

1991 and each should be ordered

to hold the other harmless for any liability therefrom.
17.

That the defendant should be ordered to obtain and

maintain life insurance on his life with a minimum face value
of $50,000.00, naming the minor child, Amber M. Jones as the

beneficiary of such policy, if available through his place of
employment.

That Defendant is free to name a trustee of his

choice should those benefits become payable.

Defendant shall

provide annual proof that such a policy is being maintained for
the benefit of the minor child.

That said policy should remain

in effect until the child attains the age of 18 years.
18.

That each of the parties agrees to cooperate with the

other, through their respective counsel, to effect changes in
titles to property ordered to be divided hereunder and to
insure that the Order entered herein is carried out in every
detai1.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court now makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That plaintiff be awcirded a Decree of Divorce, the

same to become final upon entry.
2.

That the decree of divoice be entered in accordance

with the Findings oC Fact contained herein.
DATED this

day of Sopbomber, 1992.

BY THE COURT

DISTRICT JUDGE
Approved bo form
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SEP 2 3 1992
NICOLAAS DE JONGE (0 359)
Attorney for Defendant
4 212 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utali 843 24
Telephone: 272-1013
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * *

*

DIANE SHARON JONES,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 914902425DA

JACK LLOYD JONES,
Defendant.

Judge Homer Wilkinson

* * * * * * *

The above-entitled came duly before the above-entitled
Court on the 5th day of June, 19 92, the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson presiding.

Plaintiff appeared in person and was

represented by her counsel, Ronald E. Kunz.

Defendant appeared

in person and was represented by his counsel, Nicolaas de
Jonge.

A stipulation was entered into by the parties at the

pre-trial conference, which stipulation was read into the
record.

However, the parties having discovered additional

information which rendered certain provisions of the
stipulation relating to Defendant's retirement and deferred
income plans impracticable, the parties negotiated a new
stipulation which was duly signed and executed by the parties
and their respective counsel, the original of which has been
filed with the Court.
0

This Court having reviewed the
v (? $ 5 [,«;

stipulation, and based upon the testimony of the plaintiff, and
upon the records, files and pleadings filed herein, and good
cause appearing therefore, the Court having heretofore entered
its Findings of Fact cind Conclusions of Law, now
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. That plaintiff herein is awarded a decree of divorce,
the same to become final upon entry.
2.

Each party is a fit parent to have custody of the

minor child, Amber Michelle Jones, and joint custody of the
child is hereby awarded, with physical custody, however,
residing with the Pl^iintiff, as primary custodian, and with
defendant designated as secondary custodian.

Defendant is

awarded reasonable rights of visitation with the parties1 minor
child, which minimum rights of visitation shall be in
accordcince with the district court guidelines, a copy of which
is attached hereto.
Defendants rights as a secondary custodian shall include
the following:

(i) the right to notice, consultation and input

with respect to any extraordinary medical treatment, (i.e., any
medical treatment other than routine examinations or treatment
for minor illnesses); (ii) the right to notice, consultation
and input with respect to elective medical treatment; (iii) the
right to consent to emergency medical treatment when the child
is present with Defendant during visitation periods or if
Plaintiff cannot be reasonable and promptly contacted; (iv)
direct access to school records and the right to notice and
participation in parent-te^icher consultations; (v) direct

access to medical records; (vi) right to consultation and input
with respect to any special needs of the child.
3.

Defendant is ordered to pay $430.00 per month.

Defendant's obligation to pay child support for and on behalf
of the parties1 minor child shall terminate when said child
attains the age of eighteen (18) or she is otherwise
emancipated.

Plaintiff is hereby granted an order authorizing

mandatory withholding for support in the event defendant
becomes in arrears at lecist thirty (30) days with his
obligation to pay child support.
4.

Defendant is ordered to continue to maintain medical

and dental insurance for the benefit of the parties1 minor
child, as long as such insurance is available to him through
his place of employment.

All routine medical and dental

expenses not covered by insurance are ordered to be paid by
Plaintiff.

All non-routine medical and dental expenses

incurred for the benefit of the parties1 minor child shall be
shared equally by the parties.

The diabetic care and treatment

received by the minor child, Amber Michelle Jones, are not to
be considered routine medical expenses and each of the parties
is ordered to share equally in the expense incurred for such
treatment and care.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide to the

defendant copies of billings of all non-routine medical and
dental expenses incurred for the benefit of the parties' minor
child, and the defendant is ordered to pay direct to medical
providers, within thirty days after receipt thereof, his
one-half share thereof.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide

medical and dental insurance for the minor child at such time
as such insurance becomes available to her at a reasonable
cost.

Defendant is ordered to provide to plaintiff, upon

receipt, copies of medical and dental insurance benefit
statements.
5.

The college fund currently held under the Uniform Gift

to Minors Act for the benefit of the minor child, with the
plaintiff acting as sole custodian, should be split equally
between the parties.

Defendant will act as custodian and be

required to invest one half (1/2) as he chooses under the
provisions of the Uniform Gift to Minor's Act.
6.

That except as otherwise ordered herein, the personal

property is awarded as the parties have heretofore divided it.
7.

The residence located at 9717 South 1600 West, South

Jordan, Utah is awarded to the Plaintiff, as her sole and
separate property, subject to the mortgage liability thereon,
which plaintiff is ordered to pay and discharge on a current
basis and to hold defendant harmless therefrom.

Defendant is

ordered to quit-claim all of his right, title and interest in
subject property to plaintiff within ten days after entry of
the decree of divorce herein.
8.

The unimproved real property consisting of 2.4 8 acres

located at approximately 9775 South 1550 West, South Jordan,
Utah is ordered to be sold forthwith, and the net sale proceeds
are awarded to the Defendant as his sole and separate property.
The defendant is ordered to pay and discharge any and all
income taxes which may be incurred as a result of the sale,

costs of said sale, and 1991 property taxes accrued to the date
of sale.

Furthermore, plaintiff is ordered to provide to

defendant all records and documentation in her possession
evidencing the original purchase price of subject property and
monies spent for capital improvements thereon.
9.

The real property located east of Colorado Springs,

consisting of 46.89 acres, is awarded to Defendant as his sole
and separate property, subject to a Two Thousand Dollar
($2,000.00) equitable lien hereby awarded to Plaintiff.

The

lien awarded plaintiff is p£iyeible upon the sale of subject
property or upon the minor child reaching the age of eighteen
years, whichever event occurs first.
accrue interest.

Said lien shall not

Plaintiff should be ordered to quit claim

said property to Defendant within ten days from the date of
entry of a decree of divorce herein.
10.

That plaintiff is awarded a Qualified Domestic

Relations Order (QDRO) in Defendant's retirement account
through PacifiCorp.

Plciintifffs interest in defendant's

retirement account is limited, however, to her equal share of
retirement benefits accrued to the defendant through the date
of entry of the decree of divorce herein.
11.

Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff the

sum of Nine Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($9,250.00)
as her share of the PacifiCorp common stock acquired during the
parties1 marriage.

Defendant is further ordered to pay said

amount to plaintiff from the proceeds of the sale of the land
at 9775 South 1550 West, South Jordan, Utah.

Plaintiff is
*l \x s r.

ordered to pay any taxes and penalties incurred for the sale of
Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) of PacifiCorp common stock
through a hardship withdrawal.

Defendcint is ordered to

cooperate in pi~oviding the necessary documentation for
determining Plaintiff's tax liability on the stock sale for the
filing of her 1992 Federal and State tax returns.
12.

Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of

Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in lieu of any interest she
may have in the Deferred Compensation Plan available to
Defendant through his present place of employment.

Upon

payment by defendant to plaintiff, plaintiff thereafter
irrevocably waives any right, title and interest she may
otherwise have had in defendant's Deferred Compensation Plan.
Furthermore, the $5,000.00 payable by the defendant to the
plaintiff hereunder is ordered to be paid from the net proceeds
from the sale of the unimproved land at 9775 South 1550 West,
South Jordan, Utah.
13.

Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, alimony

in the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) per month.

At

such time as Defendant has paid to Pl£iintiff the lump sums
immediately due and owing to her as provided herein, which sums
total Fourteen Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars,
(14,250.00),

alimony shall, without further order of the

Court, be immediately reduced to the sum of Six Hundred and
Fifty Dollars ($650.00) per month.

Defendant's obligation to

pay alimony to the defendant shall terminate within five years
from the entry of a decree of divorce herein, or at such time
*t U a 1 i'' \

as the Court may order, based upon a change in plaintiff's
circumstances and plaintiff's ability to provide for her own
support.
For purposes of determining defendant's continued
obligation to pay alimony to plaintiff, plaintiff is ordered to
provi.de to defendant, at his request, through Plaintiff's
counsel Ronald E. Kunz, copies of plaintiff's business records
and tax returns, for purposes of determining plaintiff's
continued need to receive alimony from the defendant.
Defendant is allowed to request and receive such financial
information from the plaintiff every six months, and such
information shall be provided by plaintiff to the defendant
within thirty days after receiving written request therefore.
Defendant may petition the Court, by v/ay of a Motion, for a
reduction in alimony payments and an adjustment of child
support based on changes in the Plaintiff's income from time to
time.
14.

Each of the parties is ordered to pay and discharge

their respective costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein.
15.

Each of the parties is ordered to pay their respective

debts and obligations incurred since the parties' separation on
May 17, 1991 and each is ordered to hold the other harmless for
any liability therefrom.
16.

Defendant is ordered to obtain and maintain life

insurance on his life, if available through his employment,
with a minimum face value of $50,000.00, naming the minor
child, Amber M. Jones as the beneficiary of such policy.

!! o ft i v ;:

Defendant is free to name a trustee of his choice should those
benefits become payable.

Defendant is ordered to provide

annual proof that such a policy is being maintained for the
benefit of the minor child.

Said policy should remain in

effect until the child attains the age of 18 years,
17.

Each of the parties agrees to cooperate with the

other, through their respective counsel, to effect changes in
titles to property ordered to be divided hereunder and to
insure that the Order entered herein is carried out in every
detail.
DATED this

23

day of September, 199 2,

BY THE COURT

/-f^
DISTRICT JUDGE
Approved to form
? ( i *~?

Rami Id Kunz

1

<)

i\ i\ & * j? •:

Cf they are
t able to agree, reasonable visitation l 11 routinely be
defined for school-age (beginning kindergarten) children as follows:
Alternate
Weekends:

Friday 6 p.m.

Sunday 6 p.m.

2

Midweek:

alternate Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.

3

Holidays:

(A) Christmas - nonr-custodial parent to have
Christmas day beginning at 1:00 p.m. and
continuing through 1/2 of the child's total
Christmas school vacation.
(B) Thanksgiving and Easter - non-custodial parent
to have Thanksgiving in even years (1990, 92,
94, etc.); Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday
6 p.m. until Sunday 6:00 p.m. Non-custodial
parent to have Easter in odd years (1991, 93,
95, etc.); Easter holiday is Friday 6 p.m.
until Sunday 6 p.m.
(C) Other holidays - New Year's Day, Martin Luther
King Day, Presidents' Day, Memorial Day, July
4th, July 24th, and Labor Day. These are to
be alternated, with the non-custodial parent
to have visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 6 p.m. on the holiday.
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation
and no changes should be made to the regular
rotation of the alternating weekend schedule.

Fathers' DayMothers' Day:

as appropriate, 6 p.m. the day before until 6 p.m.
the day of.

Birthdays:

one evening, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during the
week of the child's birthday and the non-custodial
parent's birthday.

ExtendedVisitation:

(A) Summer - 4 weeks continuous, with written notice
of dates provided to custodial parent by May
1st.
Custodial parent to have alternate
weekends, holiday, and phone visitation.
(B) Year-Round school - two 2 week periods, with
written notice of dates to custodial parent at
least 30 days prior to visitation. Custodial
parent to have holiday, and phone visitation.
(C) Each parent shall be allowed two weeks per year
uninterrupted possession of the children for
purposes of vacation, provided the same does not
interfere with holiday visitation per above.
Each parent shall notify the other in writing of
such two week period at least 3 0 days in advance,

7,

Telephone:

8

Other times as agreed,

reasonable, before 8 p.m.

o o o i (-

In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt LaKe County
STATE OF UTAH
-MANE-SIIAftQN-nJONESvs.
•QYEUIQt

,,
Case No.cg4.90.2475

Plamtill

,f

~>W^y

Financial Declaration
DCICMKLUII

Daled. F e b . 4 ,
Wile:

Husband: J a c k Llxxy-d-Jones-.
Address:

M a n e Sharon

1992

Jones

Addiess: j_7_LZ__^o . 1 6XIQ_HL
_So.__Jorjian, Utah_84Q6.5_

Soc. Sec. No..

S o c Sec

No

Occupation:

Occupation.

Employer:

Employer:.

Buihdate.

I3n Ihdatc:

528-78-]

9?3

Attorney
Self
Z^/iZf^^-l-

NOTE: THIS DECORATION MUST HE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
FAILURE BY EITIIER PARTY TO COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILETI IIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL
AUTI IORIZETI IE COURT TO ACCE1TT1 IE STATEMENT OFTI IE OTI IER PARTY ASTI IE BASIS FOR
ITS DECISION.

ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR
PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
(NOTE: To arrive at m o n t h l y figures when i n c o m e is received and ded u c t i o n s are made weekly, multiply by 4 . 3 ; if figures a r c p n a bi-weekly
basis, multiply by 2.167)

2

o
_

- - -

U n i o n or othc i clues

$
r

lOlAL MONIIILY INC OMK
Iteuu/e monthly deduc tions horn g i o s s mc oinc
State and fedeial income (axes
_
Numbei ol exemptions taken
Soc lal sec unly
__
__
Medical oi other insmanc e (desc i ibe hilly)

\<t hiement oi pension hind

i

(pav

Aiiothei sou.ces (s,>cc,K)„ H o r s e b o a r d i n g
S_ee_.attached . s c h e d u l e f o r income

explanation.

wu i«:

JIUSHAND

$

1 Gioss monthly income hoin
Salary and wages, including < ommissions. bonuses
allowances and oveitime. payable
penocl)
Pensions and letnement
Soc ud sec unlv
Disability and unemployment insuiance
Public assistanc e (wellaie. Al DC payments < Ic )
Child suppoi t fioin any pi lor man lage
Dividends ,\\u\ interest
Kents

|

_LQ(L_Qfl_
$

_

J

Other

3

(specify)

Net monthly income

$
$

IOIAL MONIHLY DLDUCUONS
take home pay

$

* 100.00

4. Debts and obligations
Cieditors Name

-Vailay—Mortgage Co-,

Home-

-U-rS-Bank

Home-

Holy C r o s s Ho&p.

Ho.sp-.biJ

Jjb.

-Eurgory-

David-Jteck-

Balance

Date Payable

Tor

-5 t h / m a n t
-^25 7 -000-i
-5th/TnonrthJOthJ-xaoxith$

IOIAL

Monthly Payment

-$388.00—
—290-rOO—

-450-250-

-5CL-CLQ$

-20^00—

(II Instil fk k nt space insei t total and at lac h st he clulc)
5 All piopeilyol the parties known to mc owiu d individually oi jointly (indicate who holds oi how title held (11) I lusband (W) Wile
(J) Jointly)
WIILRC SPACE IS INSUPI ICILNl I OR COMPl I IL INI OKMAIION OR I IS UNO PLLASL AHACII SLPARAIL SCIILDULL
Value
Owed l h e i e o n
(a) Household lutmshings

luiuituie

apphanies and cqiupnient
(b) Automobile (Year Make)

CW)

.L98Q_Euick_CfinLury_iW^).
1SO&. Ford Truck-QQ
(c) Sec unties

-0-

-3800-r-OO—
J0DJ3a.
_8i)Q.OO.

stocks bonds

-12J2-Shaqras-Pacif-icorp

Stock--(H)

-30^0-00-+.

(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks savings tk loans,
credit unions savings and checking)

-Kemper—Inves Lments U n i f o r m . Gi£t__To i l i n o r i i (W).
-Valley-Bank-&TrufiL Uniform G i f t - T o Minors(W)
- D r a p e r - B a n k - & - T r u s t - (W. )
(e) Life Insuianc e
Name of Company

Policy No

I a( c A m o u n t

3200

—700-1-000( ash value. a< c umulalcd
dividend, oi loan amount

-Sfea-te - T a r n r r r f e (H)~ ~3 0 6 81"5 7"

-24-,-QOO

Unknown

-SLatfe-Earm Life—(W) -5077564.
-Co.Life-lna
(LI)
-?

~~Io7ooo- —

Unknown.

J 50, 000 J -

(i) Piofit sharing or K r t i r c m r i i t At counts

N WK

Value of inti re st and amount prcsc nlly vc sh d

' ' Jaek-L,—JonGS-—

Name

.
— 15, 000- + currently—vest-ed
Jaek-I^—Jones (deferred income plan)-(H)-50,-000-+

(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (spec ily)

n it n /\ c i*\

Wife's K )

Husband's ( )

Proposed Settlement of Pending
Divorce Litigation
Child Suppoit $

Total (pci inoiilh) $ - 4 3 0 . - 0 0

Alimony. For 12 months, r e v i e w a b l e
i n one y e a r

'total (pei month) $ 1070.00

Piopci (y Dish lhuhon:

I P l a i n t l £ f r e c e i v e s tho—r^sidanc^Q—for—hei^sel-f—and~-the—miner—eh-irl-d—
Defendant to r e t a i n h i s e q u i t y u n t i l t h e c h i l d t u r n
18 y e a r s of
a^e, p l a i n t i f f r e m a r r i e s , or c o - h a b i t a t o s .
2 . P l a i n t i f f t o retain^O;h^^propGi^t-y---^t^-7-7-5-So-—1500—Vk
The p r o p e r t y i s used by the minor c h i l d and has a r i rl 1 ng^anarmand barn which p l a i n t i f f wants to keep for t h e minor c h i l d .
3_—Tn exchange—fxxxi--daXendan4^&~aqu4-ty-—in—bive—2—1-/2 a c r e preper^ty—
p l a i n t i f f w i l l s u r r e n d e r her i n t c x g ^ L i n d e f e n d a n t s d e f e r r e d
income p l a n which i s c u r r e n t l y valued a t over $50,000.00
4, Plalnt-iff wi-14—r-e-tain--her—eur-rent—interest—in-&&fendan^s—r^feg
and receive a QDRQ.
5-,—The reaJ—property in Colorado wil4^-b^--r^^aJ^nQ4--by both—partis
until it can be profitably sold, proceeds to be divided hetwppn thp
— t h e partias^_Eroperty taxes-to-ho- s^l-irt—by the parties
6—Company~-s4;ock h^Ld~by-^tha—compan-y—t=rO—be sp-l-it between the parties.—
Plaintiff will receive an immediate hardship salp and di strihnf-i on
— o f her shaxe~,

7. ^Db.fendant t o g i v e p l a i n - t i f f
thp p n r t i p s
8

1/2 of t h e s-to^k—that—he-has sQ-14-&-in^B

snp^r^M'nn

Personal property has been divided in a way agrppnhlp tn hnth

parties
9.

Defendant should be rnquirnd

tn nnnt-ri'bnfp $4Q QQ I n t o a c o l l e g e

fund fu^x—tho-minor ch44r4-arS—ha4~ been--the p r a e - t i e e - p r i o r t o s e p a r a t i o n ,

( J K A N D T O T A L (pei m o n t h ) $
, piopose (lie above s e t t l e m e n t .

,

11 this mallei i c q i i h e s a h lal, ll will lake appioximately
will be called for tins party.

(

Pl.imhll Dclendan!

homsand

witnesses

0 i\ (\ h Q *>

REAL ESTATE '(continued)
Address

9775 So. 1550 W.
So. Jordan, Ut.

Original Cost

$25,000.00

Additions

$10,000.00

Total Cost

$35,000.00

Mtg. balance

$ (5)

Type of Property
2 1/2 acres with barn &
riding arena
Date of Acquisition
Present value

$45,000.00

Basis of valuation
Taxes

June 1885

Costs, improvements
some appreciation

$ 400.00

Address

Lincoln County, Colorado (J) Type

Original Cost

$9,000.00

Additions

None

Total cost

$9,000.00

Mtg. BalancQ

$

Taxes

$ 10-15/year

Date

46.89 acres
1975

Present value

?

0

«') f) (\ n 5.: i

Additional expenses
Child's allowance

$ 20.00

Horsehoeing

30.00

Veterinary bills

20.00

Postage, newspaper

10.00

(HKXiKr.

ATTACHMENT

(INCOME)

Plaintiff was unemployed at the time of the parties1 separation
and had remained at home as a homemaker for 15 years.
Plaintiff attempted (for over a period of 6 months to find a
position in either law practice or other areas.
In January 1992, plaintiff entered into an office sharing
arrangement in Midvale in order to try and generate some
income and increase her practical experience. In order to enter
the practice of law, plaintiff borrowed a substantial amounnt
of money from family.
To this date, plaintiff is running at a deficit but is
making some progress in covering her monthly expenses.
She cannot project at what point her law practice will generate
enough income to cover monthly expenses and repay start up
costs .

w o o <> s: <;
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Mv Commission E x p n r s :

in Sail Lake County, Utah
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HRING T O T H E PRE-TRIAL HEARING A L L D O C U M E N T S A N D O T H E R SUPPORTING INFORMATION
NECESSARY T O VERIEY OR EXPLAIN T H E S T A T E M E N T S M A D E IN T H I S D E C L A R A T I O N , I N C L U D I N G
HUT NOT L I M I T E D TO. PAYROLL STUI3S FOR T H E M O S T RECENT 1)0 DAYS. 3 M O S T RECENT TAX
IUCTURNS. CREDIT UNION S H A R E S T A T E M E N T S . PASSH()OKS, ('HICCKHOOKS. C A N C E L L E D C H E C K S ,
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES A N D OTHER RELEVANT A N D M A T E R I A L D O C U M E N T A T I O N .

o o o o s';

(h) Re al I n s t a t e ( W h e r e m o i e t h a n o n e p a i e e1 ol it al e s t a t e o w i u d a l l a e h s l u e t w i t h ul< ntie al mfoi m a l u m l o r all a d d i t i o n a l p r o p e l ty)

ivi>< oi rmp(ityresJLderica__+_ L_acre._

A«i«i.«-ss9.7X7_So,-J.dOO W„ ( J ) —
So. J o r d a n , - Ut-_84065
oi.n

D a l e ol A c ( | u i s i t i o n A u g U R t -

C M $ 49L 7 _500 -OQ

Basis oi valuation ^gr^jemen±_hy_„p-arHij

C o s t o! A d d i t i o n s $
'lot.il Tost $
MU

llal.nnc*_25

oiiui i.uns$

f

0 0 0 ,

15-76.

lcil.il I'.ese ii( V a l u e $ _ _ 8 ? , 0 Q Q _ Q . Q _

0 0

9,000.00-

I quity 1> __

Amoiti/ahon % 6 7 8

laxes $ — - i n c l u d e d

And to whomValley_ M o r t g a g e .
U_S_J&ank

00

in-mortgage-

Individual ( o n t i i h u t i o n s

(i) B u s i n e s s mle l e s t (inelu ale n a m e

shaie

type ol b u s i n e s s value le s s mele b t e e l n e s s )

(j) O t h e i a s s e t s (Spee ily)

G

lot.il m o n t h l y t \ p e n s e s *(Spee ily whie h p a i t v is t l u < u s t o d i a l p a i e u l a n d list n a m e a n d l e l a l i o n s h i p ol all m e m b e i s o l
house hold w h o s e e x p e n s e s a t e i i u l t u l t d )

HUSBAND

* Diane S . - J o n e s , c u s t o d i a l
iArtiber- M.- J o n e s , - d a u g h t e r

parent

of-

Wli C

$

Rent oi moit^a^e p a y m e n t s (lesidenee)

J&JSrQQ-

Real p.operly taxes (lesulenee)
i n c l u d e d -in-HlOr t a g e
Real piopeity i n s u i a n e e (les.elene e i n c l u d e d
i n m o r t g a g e
Mamie nane e (lesulent e)
Utilihe s i n e h i d i n g w a l e i
le le phone _

—

—SO .4)0—
-400^-00—
-135.-00—
—18-. 00—

_

1 o o d a n d h o u s e holel s u p p l i e s

the

_

_

eleetneity ^ a ^ a i u l l u a t

_

_

_ _

1 auneliy and e leaning
Clothing

.

-50^0
-50,00—

Me d u a l
Dental

_

_

I n s u i a i u e (lilt* a t e u l e n t e n m p t e he n s i v e li.ibilitv e l i s . i b i h t \ ) 1 xe Iuele Pay i<>H Define te el

-8.00-

( lulel e a i e
P a y m e n t ol e lulel s p o u s a l s u p p o i t j e pue>i maniai<e*
Se lu)ol

_

L n l e i t a mine nt (me hide s e l u b s

soe lal o h l u * a t u r n s

l i a \ t I i ee ie a (ion)

IIK ule u ( . l i s (fM o o n u n i ' , te>haeee) a l e o l u i l i^ills a n d e l o n a l i o u s )

-40-rOO-

___

-50-rOO— I

I i.tnspoi tation (e)thei than autnmohile)
Ante) ex|)e u s e ( ^ a s . oil

lepau

insuianee)

_

KHL_Qil_
0

____

Ante) p a y m e n l s

__

I list all me nt p a y m e nt(s)

(I use 11 t o t a l anel a t t a e It tie mi/< el se he eiule

il ne>t lully set l o i l h in (el) o n t h e l u s t p a ^ e ' l u ie ol)

_

_7Q^QQ_
_80_QQ.

_

O i l i n e x p e n s e ' s ( I n s e i t ( o l a l anel spe e ily o n a l t a e he el se heel ule )

$
IOIA1

I \ T I NSl S

-1-7-29.00A *\ o /> n

In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County

\o

STATE OF UTAH

O
rn
"X.

_ ) , 4*J£'

Case No

? M ^ M T

o

Plaintiff

c

\//>C*

N/£t>A/C±

Dated,

Delcndant

6

Husband.

Wile

Addiess* _

Address

Sec No

Occupation
Hniploycr

t/o/ y

",

/4A/C
J^_^£^/CS_
?~7/-7
S
'Coo
*_)>>

SOL.

— **

Financial Declaration

vs.

m
m

' PPY

s

(O.

3

i^SO < O SI AJ

Soc. Sec. No.:

SoZ

f

Occupation

' ^ / * cy»/i/£ y

a

~? P - / ? 4. 3

Fin pi oyer. __^ <*-~V /"'

_

HnlhcUe

Birthdate. ___

^ ^ ' C

'^,

'?&'

NO Hi THIS DECLARATION MUST BE PILED W i l l i THE DOMESTIC CALIiNDAR CLERK S DAYS
PRIOR 'I 0 TI Hi PRIM RIAL 11 LA RING.
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL
AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR
ITS DECISION.
ANY EALSE S T A T E M E N T MADE H E R E O N S H A L L S U B J E C T YOU TO T H E PENALTY EOR
PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
S TATEMEN'I OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
(NO IK: 'I o ariive nl monl til > figures when income is ieeeived and
deductions are made week!}, mulhpl} by 4.3; if ligiues aie on a bi-ttcckly
hasis, multiply by 2.167)
(noss monthly income lioni
Salaiy .ind waecs, including commissions, bonuses,
allowances and overtime, payable _
_
penod)
Pensions <uul retncment
_
Social sec in ily
_
_
Disability and unemployment msuiance
Public assistance (welfare, AI DC payment, etc )
Child support Irom any poor maitiage
Dividends and inteiesl
Rents
All othci souiccs (Specify)
^ ^ " ^ y .

HUSBAND

WIM«

(pay
_

_
_

_

<Lo •

_

r)

o

4' S o . o o
%

TOTAL MON Hll Y I N C O M h .

%

$

Itemize monthly deductions from gioss income

3o&

Slate and federal income taxes

no

Number of exemptions taken

c^S'o j?_o j

Social secunty
Medical oi othei insurance (dcscnbe fully) _
Union oi othei dues .
Rctiiement oi pension fund
S.ivmj»s pl.in

_

—

_ _

Other: (specify)

$
$

TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS
3.
4.

Net monthly income - take home pay

$ i23oy.

no

Debts and obligations:
For

Creditor's Name
/ > <o Slr

^j £j

•'V*? S T

5V:

KJX.

O

/>?,*)**

.^ ^

Date Payable
/9a

4 &

7~o

/!<-.. j

«j

SS*

Balance

^

/£',

/X>Ss> ,?•**„

OJfTS-rC-HA;

~

/ > ?

ov°v. c P

^ ^ P . O O

v T ' 7 , r OT>
.5" ?<>>(?. 3 V

l/Sfl

'S

Monthly Payment

£ ^ r ^

«>?r>. o n "/•

AJCcooc-oC't'si^

$

TOTAL

$

(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule)
5.

All property of the parties known to me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (II) Husband, (W) Wife, (J) Jointly).
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE.
Value

$

(a) Household furnishings, furniture,

Owed Thereon

$

appliances and equipment
(b) Automobile (Year-Make)

(c) Securities - stocks, bonds

(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings & loans,
credit unions - savings and checking)

Cash value, accumulated

(e) Life Insurance:
Name of Company

Policy No.

Face Amount

dividend, or loan amount

/1/rWC

(f) Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts
Name __A/„CLJ\£-£..

Name
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (specify)

Value of interest and amount presently vested

(h)

Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, attach sheet with identical information for all additional property)
Address

Type of Property

Original Cost $

Total Present Value $_

Cost of Additions $

Basis of Valuation

Date of Acquisition

Total Cost $
Mtg. Balance $
Other Liens $
Equity $

Monthly Amortization _

And to whom

Taxes $
Individual contributions

(i)

Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness)

(j)

Other assets (Specify)

6.

Total monthly expenses: *(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of all members of the househokl whose
expenses are included.)

HUSBAND

WIFE

Z_.>22r:^/QvC__C^^^a._.^..^MP_

*:JSL

£ikj*.£Ms:c&..^-

Uent or mortgage payments (residence)
Real property taxes (residence)

,/

-XA/C-CUO^

Real property insurance (residence)

VO £\ a o

__
' V V 7.\.

'' ._

/>7

.^V ?T._

*

Maintenance (residence)

3 So. oo

Pood and household supplies
Utilities iiu hiding water, electricity, gas and heal
Telephone

f

_r ec^» *,_<~._

3?. oo
^.oo
So. oo

.._

Paunchy and cleaning
Clothing

_

__

Medical

JZJ5I.(?O_.

Dental ._._

so. oo

Insurance (life, accitlent, comprehensive liability, disability) Exclude Payroll Deducted

J\______

Child Care
*///?..
Payment of child spousal support re: prior marriage _j_V_/9
School

_

_

___

_

Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, travel recreation)

/' DO. oct

Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gilts, and donations)

/'35~. o o

Transportation (other than automobile)
Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance)
Auto payments
Installment payment(s). (Insert total ami attach itemized schedule
if not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof)
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule)

3'______aa
/ o o . oo

y.s~?.^

STATU 0 I ; UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKR

ss.

I swear that the matters slated herein aie true and con eel,
V^
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
/V

AROi YN IIArEN
'' * * K»<uifh Stale St 010'*
f.'i'ivato, Utah A4047
'•»y > \>mmKsion £xpiro<;
' ohruary 2ij, 1S96

|

day of

i9 ; y

lo'iilg im Sail Lake Coun ty, Utah
Notjfy Public lesidinli

My Commission Expues:

STATK OF UTAH
BRING TO MIL PRF-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTIILR SUPPORTING INFORMATION
NFCLSSARY TO VFRIFY OR FXPLAIN Till- STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DHCLARATION, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITFD TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THH MOST RLCFNT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX
RETURNS, CREDIT UNION SHARP! STATEMENTS, PASSBOOKS, CIIFCKBOOKS, CANCELLED CIIHCKS,
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION.

iltlMjai'iii'* \

)

Proposed Settlement of Pending
Divorce Litigation
Child Support $

Total (per month) $

Alimony:

Total (per month) $

Property Distribution:

GRAND TOTAL (per month) $
I,

, propose the above settlement.

Plaintiff/Defendant
If this matter requires a trial, it will take approximately
be called for this party.

hours and

witnesses will

OTHER EXPENSES

Monthly

Newspaper

$8.24

Child's Allowance ($15.00/wk x 4.3)

$64.50

Upkeep of Child's Horses

$65.00

Veterinary Bills

$21.00

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
JONES, DIANE SHARON
PLAINTIFF
VS
JONES, JACK LLOYD

CASE NUMBER 914 902425 DA
DATE 07/20/94
HONORABLE MICHAEL S. EVANS
COURT REPORTER NO TAPE
COURT CLERK CPW

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. RICE, JOHN K
D. ATTY. SKOUBYE, JEFF B

COMM. RECOMMENDS THIS MATTER CERTIFIED READY FOR TRIAL.
COMM'S PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT OF CONTESTED ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY
COUNSEL ARE;
1. ONLY ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT IS DEFT'S REQUEST THAT ALIMONY
BE TERMINATED IN LIGHT OF PLTF'S INCOME INCREASING FROM $80
PER MONTH TO $1773 PER MONTH--SUGGEST CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
HAS OCCURRED AND COURT SHOULD ENTER APPROPRIATE ALIMONY
AWARD CONSIDERING PARTIES PRESENT FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
2. FEES - - N O SUGGESTION.

A

/i A

»f ft A

Jeff B. Skoubyc - No. 6034
Attorney for Defendant
8282 S. State Street, Suite 18
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 562-8855

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKL COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DIANE SHARON JONES,

AFFIDAVIT OF JACK LLOYD JONES
Civil No. 914902425DA

Plaintiff,

Judge Homer Wilkinson

vs.
JACK LLOYD JONES,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

COMES NOW JACK LLOYD JONES and being duly sworn states as follows:
1.

I am the above-named Defendant, I have personal Knowledge of the matters

set forth hereafter and I am fully competent to testify concerning these matters.
2.

The Plaintiff and I were married July 1, 1973 in Anchorage, Alaska.

3.

We have one Minor child, Amber M. Jones, Born September 3, 1979. Amber

is presently fifteen years of age.
4.

When we were first married the Plaintiff worked out side the home for over

'.} u c < o;-

three years. After long discussion, it was decided that the Plaintiff would quit work and
pursue a career in law. The Plaintiff made a commitment to me that she would not quit this
thing in the middle. That she would follow through and become an attorney and I would
enjoy the benefits of having a working attorney in the family.
5.

The plan was that she would go to law school. This required that we leave

Alaska as there were no law schools in Alaska at the time. At this time we left Alaska and a
job offer that paid over $60,000 per year so (hat the Plaintiff could attend Law School. That
was big money in 1976. So we moved to Utah and I accepted a job that paid only $12,000
per year, this was a very large cut in pay.
6.

The Plaintiff attended Law School from Sept 1976 until Spring of 1979 and

became licensed to practice law (passed the bar) in the Summer of 1979. In that period the
Plaintiff had no income, She relied totally on me for support, to pay her tuition and buy her
law books. In other words I financed the Plaintiff's law degree. In the property settlement
nothing was mentioned about the value of the law degree that she obtained during the
marriage.
7.

From summer of 1979 until our separation I tried to get the Plaintiff to find

employment or do something with her law degree instead of sitting home.

This was the

main point of contention between us all those years. The Plaintiff did do a little work in the
years between 1979 and the time of our separation. She established a tax preparation
business on a small scale and took on a few cases as an attorney. However she would not do
2
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any thing that looked like it would require a large amount of work.
8.

The Plaintiff would not keep the commitment that she made before I agreed to

send her to law school. Bven after our daughter started school about 10 years ago, Plaintiff
still refused to earn a living.
9.
1992.

The Plaintiff and 1 were separated in April of 1991 and divorced Sept 23,

Our divorce took almost 18 months.
10.

In a temporary order, dated in May 1991, the court granted Plaintiff temporary

alimony at a very high rate. The court also ordered Plaintiff to find employment. Plaintiff
failed to earnestly seek employment. She believed that I owed her a living and she did not
have to work. The Plaintiff made the statement more than once that she would bleed me for
every penny she could, and that is what I believe she is trying to do now.
11.

In December of 1991 The Plaintiff, decided to open a law office. This was

not to my liking because through the alimony 1 was paying her, I was being forced to finance
her set up in a law practice. In other words, 1 was being required to help buy her a law
practice, when I already paid for her law degree.
12.

After she began her law practice, Plaintiff would not admit to earning any

money. In all the discussions we had trying to reach a settlement, the Plaintiff and her
Attorney stated many times over that the Plaintiff was not making any income from her law
practice. They staled that all the income was being eaten up by expenses.
13.

On June 5, 1992, we were scheduled for a pretrial conference. I appeared
3
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with my attorney the Plaintiff was present with her attorney. At the pretrial conference we
tried to get the Plaintiff and her attorney to admit that the Plaintiff was making an income
from the law practice that she had started about six months earlier. If we could get them to
admit income from this source then the amount of the alimony in question would have been
decreased. However they would not admit that the income existed and the alimony amount
was set based on the nighty dollars ($80.00) income from caring for horses.
14.

The alimony amount was also affected by other factors in the case. Those

other factors included Plaintiff's receipt of the home and a large cash settlement. The fact
that Plaintiff had obtained a law degree and became a member of the Utah State Bar financed
by me was also included in the calculus. A settlement agreement was reached and the Judge
granted the Divorce based on our agreement.
15.

I did not like this settlement agreement because it included alimony. It was

my position that the plaintiff should not be entitled to alimony because she had a law degree
and was a member of the Utah State Bar. It is my fervent belief that the Plaintiff is totally
capable of earning more money than me. The fact that the Plaintiff refused to use her degree
and license for so many years should have made it so alimony was out of the question. I
wanted at the time of the pretrial hearing to go on to trial so that my attorney could argue
that point. He refused, as he said it "Judge Wilkinson will not hear this case, the judge has
ordered us to settle." I am sorry now that I did not stick to what I felt at that time and insist
that we go to trial.
4
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16.

A short time after the pretrial conference, we discovered that our settlement

could not be executed because our agreement called for a division of my Deferred Income
Plan. The Division of my Deferred Income Plan was not allowed by my employer.
17.

The Plaintiff and I then went back to the negotiating table without our

attorneys. We hammered out an agreement that I could live with. It called for a declining
rate of alimony that would decrease each year to zero in five years. The alimony would be
decreased to a livable level in a year or two. We agreed that the Plaintiff was to have the
agreement put in final form and I was to sign it, and that would be the end of this terrible
mess. The Plaintiff went to her attorney and they draw up the agreement. When I received
a copy of what they came up with, it was not anything like what I agreed to earlier. Because
that paper was not what I agreed to I would not sign it.
18.

The Plaintiff filed a court action to force me to sign that paper. Instead of

going to court, my attorney scheduled a conference with the Plaintiff, her Attorney, himself
and me in his office. In this conference we hammered out another agreement and reduced
the agreement to paper with us all still present.
19.

The agreement that we made was based on the Plaintiff having an income of

$80 per month. Plaintiff and her attorney would never admit that her law practice had any
income that was not eaten up by expenses. It was also based on the fact that the plaintiff
would get a very large cash settlement of $14,250, all the equity in the family home, and
almost all of the other marital property. Had the calculation of alimony hinged upon income

of the Plaintiff of $1,426 per month, I would not have agreed to (he alimony provided in the
Stipulation since such an amount of income along with the child support of $430 per month
would have been sufficient for Plaintiff to have met her own monthly expenses of $1,439.10
per month and maintained herself at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage
20. In our agreement, we also agreed (hat I would have access to (he Plaintiffs
business records every six monlhs so that as soon as the income of the Plaintiff went up from
$80 per month, 1 could pel it ion the court (o dcciease the alimony.
21.

The agreement stated that I was to pay child support of $430 which was

consistent with the laws of the Slate of Utah. I was not concerned about an increase in
Plaintiff's income increasing child support since an increase in her income would also
allocate more of the child support to her and have very little effect on my child support
obligation.
22.

In November of 1992, my attorney advised me that I could gain access to

Plaintiffs business records since it had been over six months since I had access to them. My
attorney made the request for the records in Novembei. In December of 1992 we received a
letter from the Plaintiffs attorney stating that they would not comply with (he request
because it had not been six months since the divorce date of September 23 1992. And that I
was behind in my support payments. This was not true, I was never any more than a few
days late with the support payments. My attorney explained to me that the payments were
not late unless they were more than 30 days late and they were never 30 days late.
6
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23.

I finally obtained the business records in the latter part of March, 1993. The

records clearly showed an increase in income. So on the advice of my attorney we filed a
Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce to terminate alimony. It is now apparent that
the Plaintiff is earning more than her expenses and that her income has more than
compensated for the alimony I am paying her.
24.

In the Plaintiff's latest financial declaration there is an item that should not be

allowed to be included as expenses. This item is the car payment of nearly $400. The
luxury of owning a car valued at about $20,000 is not something that I enjoyed in all the time
of my marriage with the plaintiff nor do I enjoy that kind of thing now. During our marriage
the most expensive cars we owned were a new AMC Javelin which we purchased for
approximately $3,400 and a used Thunderbird purchased for approximately $5,000. The
monthly payments on these cars was never over $100 to $150 per month. The Plaintiff is
now living above the standard of living enjoyed during our marriage.
25.

Because there has been a substantial increase in Plaintiff's income since the

time of divorce and the Plaintiff is now able to support herself and provide for herself the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, my obligation to pay alimony should be
terminated retroactive to the date of the petition for modification.
26.

I have made numerous attempts to negotiate with Plaintiff a decrease in my

alimony obligation. However, Plaintiff has flatly refused to even entertain any settlement
offers despite my clear entitlement to a termination of alimony and despite the requirement of
7
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(he court that the parties enter into meaningful negotiations. Plaintiff has also taken every
opportunity to delay these proceedings. Due to Plaintiffs refusal to negotiate meaningfully
and her delay of these proceedings, I have been forced to incur substantial attorneys fees. It
is only reasonable and cquilable that I should be awarded my attorneys fees incurred in
pursuing this action for modification and defending against Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
27.

Plaintiff has not incurred any attorneys (cos in proceeding in this case due to

her ability to swap legal services. Therefore, it is reasonable and equitable that Plaintiff be
ordered to pay all, or at least a portion of my attorneys fees incurred in pursuing this action.
28.

In my divorce settlement I was awarded a large amount of money. I put this

money in savings. Because of the fact that in the past three and one half years I have had to
pay over $42,000 in alimony and child support to the Plaintiff plus thousands of dollars in
attorney fees, the large savings has been totally depleted.
DATED this JJ?

day of September, 1994.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICXEccouwv

.

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REPQEIER1S_PARTIAL
il3£NSCRiPT_QF_HEARING

DIANE S. JONES,
PLAINTIFF,

QN_.t!QIIQN_.EQE'_iUt!t!ARY
jyDGMENI_AND_CROSSz
dQIIQN_FgR~SyNMARY
JUDGMENT:. Q Q U R T I S _ R I J L I N G

VS.
JACK L. JONES,

CIVIL MO. 914902425
HON. HOMER F. WILKINSON

DEFENDANT.

BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE i4TH_DAY_QF

QQIQiEBi_i22^i

CONTINUING IN THE IO:00 A.M. LAW AND MOTION

CALENDAR, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CONTINUED IN HEARING IN
COURTROOM NO. 502 OF THE COURTS BUILDING, METROPOLITAN HALL OF
JUSTICE, 240 EAST 400 SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, BEFORE THE
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH.
APPEARANCES
<2QHN_!<i_RIQEjL_ATT0RNEY-AT-LAW, 7434 SOUTH STATE
STREET, SUITE 102, MIDVALE, UTAH 84047 TELEPHONE 568-1500
APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF.
JEEE_5i_iKDyBYEA_ATT0RNEYzAT-LAW, 8282 SOUTH
STATE STREET, SUITE 18, MIDVALE, UTAH 84 047 TELEPHONE 562-8855
APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT.

ORIGINAL
0 0 0 7a 7

1

(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED

2

IN OPEN COURT:)

3

THE COURT:

THANK YOU, COUNSEL.

COUNSEL FOR

4

THE DEFENSE ARGUED THAT THERE ARE THREE THINGS THE COURT CAM

5

LOOK AT AS FAR AS WHAT WAS CONTEMPLATED:

6

A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

7

I'VE REVIEWED THIS MATTER, THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION, AND I

8

SO RULE, THAT AT THE TIME THIS STIPULATION WAS DRAWN UP, AND I

9

AGREE WITH WHAT COUNSEL SAYS; THE STIPULATION SHOULD BE

10

WHETHER THERE'S BEEN

IN THE LAST ONE, ON THE MERITS, AS

ADHERED TO AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED.

11

THE PARTIES DID ANTICIPATE THAT THE PLAINTIFF

12

WAS GOING TO COMMENCE A LAW PRACTICE, THAT SHE HAD NOT BEEN IN

13

EXTENSIVE WORK AS FAR AS THE LAW UP TO THAT TIME.

14

DISPUTE; THEY SAY £80 IN THE DECREE, YET THE PLEADINGS OR-

IS

THE—WELL, THE PLEADINGS, THE MEMORANDUM ARGUES THE PROPERTY

16

WAS SOLD.

17

THE TIME THE DECREE WAS ENTERED, WHICH MAY MEAN SHE DIDN'T

18

HAVE ANY INCOME.

THERE'S A

AND MY UNDERSTANDING IS IT WAS SOLD BEFORE OR AT

19

IF THAT WAS THE CASE, COUNSEL ARGUES THAT SHE

20

HAD INCOME OF $872 IN HIS PLEADINGS.

I DON'T THINK IT MAKES

21

THAT MUCH DIFFERENCE EITHER WAY, WHETHER SHE DID OR DIDN'T, OR

22

WHAT IT WAS.

23

THAT, ANTICIPATED THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GOING TO START A LAW

24

PRACTICE AND THAT EVERY SIX MONTHS THAT SHE WOULD MAKE KNOWN

25

TO THE DEFENDANT WHAT HER EARNINGS WERE.

I THINK THAT THE PARTIES, THE WAY THEY WORDED

ft 0 0 7 fs S

WITHIN ONE MONTH AFTER THE DIVORCE, THE
DEFENDANT STARTED TO INQUIRE INTO IT, WHICH WAG IN VIOLATION,
THAT THE INCREASE AG FAR AG HER LAW PRACTICE WAG CONTEMPLATED
BY THE PARTIES.
THE OUrGTJON 1G:

WHEN IT GOT TO AN AMOUNT THAT

WOULD BE GUFF1C1ENI TO CUT BACI OR TO TERMINATE THE ALIMONY.
THE COURT IS UF THE OPINION THAT THIS WAS
CONTEMPLATED BY 1 HE PART LEG AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE DECREE,
AND THAT THE AMOUNT HAG NOT REACHED A POINT OF WHERE THE
ALIMONY WOULD BE TERMINATED.
THE COURT IS ALSO OF THE OPINION THAT LOOPING
AT IT, THE SECOND IGGUE AG TO WHAT THE DEFENSE ARGUES AG FAR
AG CHANGE Or CIRCUMSTANCEG, THERE HAS NOT BEEN A SUFFICIENT
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE PARTIES' INCOME TO WARRANT THE
TERMINATION OF ALIMONY.
THE COURT WOULD ALSO INDICATE TO THE PARTIES
THAT LF THIS MATTER WAG BEFORE ME ON THE SAME EVIDENCE WHICH
YOU'VE ARGUED IN YOUR MEMORANDA, THAT THE COURT WOULD NOT
TERMINATE ALIMONY BAGED ON THE OVERALL PICTURE AS FAR AS THE
PARTIES ARE CONCERNED.
THEREFORE I'M GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

THE PLAJNTJFF WILL PREPARE THE PLEADINGS.

] WILL AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES FOR THE PLAINTIFF ALSO.
AFFIDAVIT ON THEM, THOUGH.

I WANT AN

I DON'T FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH THE

AMOUNT WHICH YOU'VE STATED.
MR. SKOUBYE:

YOUR HONOR, WITH RESPECT TO

ATTORNEYS FEES, ALSO THE PLAINTIFF H A S — .
THE COURT:

I WOULD DENY THE DEFENDANT'S

ATTORNEYS FEES.
MR. SKOUBYE:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

I WAS

GOING TO ASK, THOUGH, YOUR HONOR, WITH RESPECT TO THE
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS FEES, SHE HAS NOT ACTUALLY INCURRED ANY
OUT-OF-POCKET ATTORNEYS FEES IN THIS CASE.
THE COURT:

I UNDERSTAND, COUNSEL.

I'VE READ

IT, AND I UNDERSTAND HOW IT'S BEEN DONE, AND THOSE ARE STILL
ATTORNEYS FEES THAT COULD BE INCURRED.
MR. RICE:
CLARIFICATION:

YOUR HONOR, ONE POINT OF

I'LL SUBMIT THAT AFFIDAVIT WITHIN FIVE DAYS.

HOW DOES THE COURT WANT TO PROCEED THEN IN RULING ON THE
AMOUNTS?

YOU'LL JUST SIMPLY ISSUE YOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION?
THE COURT:

ATTORNEYS FEES.

WELL, SUBMIT THE AFFIDAVIT ON THE

COUNSEL CAN RESPOND TO IT, AND THEN I'LL MAKE

A DECISION AS TO HOW MUCH—WHAT I THINK REASONABLE IS.
MR. RICE:

THANK YOU.

(WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.)

(TRANSCRIBED BY ALISON HOLLADAY)
4
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BiEQBIiEli^QiBIIElQ^Ii
STATE OF UTAH

)
SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, ED MIDGLEY, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT
THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME
STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE TIMES AMD PLACES HEREIN SET
FORTH; THAT SAID REPORT WAS, BY ME, SUBSEQUENTLY CAUSED TO BE
REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 THROUGH 4,
BOTH INCLUSIVE; THAT SAID REPORT SO TRANSCRIBED CONSTITUTES A
TRUE AMD CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE
ADDUCED AMD PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE.
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND THIS
28TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 1994, AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH.

ED MIDOLEY, RPR,'CM
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
(UTAH CSR NQ. 133)

0 0071 i

JAN 0 3 1395

JOHN K. RICE, USB #4397
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. BOX 896
17 North Main
Midvale, Utah
84047
Telephone: (801) 568-1500

N

V.hfk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DIANE S. JONES,

]
Plaintiff,

vs.

]
i
]

SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

JACK L. JONES,

Defendant.

)
]>

Civil No. 914902425
Judge Homer Wilkinson

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing this 14th
day of October, 1994 at the hour of 10:00 a.m., the Honorable
Judge Homer Wilkinson presiding; John K. Rice, attorney, appeared
for and on behalf of the Plaintiff and Jeff B. Skoubye, attorney,
appeared for and on behalf of the Defendant; the parties having
filed cross motions Cor summary judgment supported by their
respective memoranda, pleadings and affidavits, the Court having
reviewed all such motions, memoranda, pleadings and affidavits as
well as the record herein, the Court also having heard the
argument of counsel for both parties, the Court otherwise being
fully advised in the premises and for good cause shown therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
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1.

That the Plaintiff's income from her law practice is

contemplated in the decree of divorce itself and the parties'
contemplated Plaintiff's income from her law practice at the time
they entered into their alimony settlement agreement;
2.

That the Defendant has not genuinely controverted any

material fact sufficient to preclude granting summary judgment in
favor of the Plaintiff;
3.

That, in addition,

the Court has considered the

Defendant's facts, including those that Defendant contends are
disputed.

Even considering all such facts, the Defendant has

failed to establish any material facts sufficient to meet his
burden of showing a substantial or material change in the income
of the parties that was not contemplated by them as part of their
alimony settlement agreement or in the divorce decree at the time
of entry, and, even if the same facts were before the Court for a
trial upon the merits, Defendant has not shown any reasonable
probability of prevailing at trial.
4.

That the Defendant is not entitled to a reduction or

termination of alimony at this time.
5.

That the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is

granted and the Defendant's Petition for Modification of Decree
of Divorce is dismissed with prejudice.
6.

That the Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment

is denied.
7.

That the Defendant's Petition for Modification of Decree
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of Divorce was without merit and not brought in good faith and
the Plaintiff is therefor entitled to an award of her attorney
fees incurred in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §78-2756 (1956), as amended.

The Plaintiff has incurred attorney fees

in the defense of the Defendant's petition for modification in
the reasonable amount of $4,146.00 and Plaintiff is granted
judgment against Defendant for said amount.
8.

That the Defendant's request for an award of attorney

fees and costs is denied and Defendant shall bear his own costs
and attorney fees.
DATED this J>

,

——

day of Pfeeewber-?—1-9-94-.
BY THE COURT:
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, to the
following:
Jeff Skoubye
Attorney at Law
8282 South State Street, #18
Midvaie, Utah 84047
DATED this

/<£

day of December, 1994.
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